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PROTECTING SOCIETY AND DEFENDANTS
TOO: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
OF MENTAL ABNORMALITY AND
INTOXICATION DEFENSES
SUSAN F. MANDIBERG*
INTRODUCTION
N a series of cases' culminating in Patterson v. New York,' the United
States Supreme Court has held that due process requires the prosecu-
tion in a criminal case to prove3 beyond a reasonable doubt every element
in the definition of the crime charged.' Stated baldly, the prosecutor's
burden of persuasion seems very demanding indeed. Practically speak-
ing, however, this burden may amount to nothing more than a require-
ment that the prosecutor's evidence be logically coherent. Such would be
the case, for example, if the defendant put on no evidence whatsoever.
On the other hand, if the defendant did present a case, the prosecutor's
evidence would have to be persuasive enough to overcome any doubts
raised by the defense documents and witnesses.
Assume, for example, a murder charge that requires the state to prove
that the defendant intended to kill a human being. The prosecutor can
prove that the defendant aimed a gun at the victim and shot point-blank.
If this is the only evidence, the jury will likely conclude beyond a reason-
able doubt that the defendant did have the requisite intent. But what if
the defendant presents evidence that he was so delusional when he did
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark
College. The author would like to thank the following people who read drafts of this
Article and offered suggestions which, while not always integrated, were all greatly ap-
preciated: Professors Brian Blum, Stephen Kanter, Bill Williamson, Judith Miller and
Dean Arthur LaFrance of Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College;
Professors Richard Bonnie and John Jeffries of the University of Virginia School of Law;
and Professor Laird Kirkpatrick of the University of Oregon School of Law. The author
is also indebted to her research assistant and devil's advocate, Kathi Stout.
1. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
3. "Prove" in this context refers to the burden of persuasion.
The burden of production refers to the obligation to raise an issue. The burden
of persuasion refers to the risk of uncertainty as to the issue's resolution. Thus,
the party bearing the burden of production will have an issue resolved against
him if it is not raised by the evidence. The party bearing the burden of persua-
sion will have an issue resolved against him if, after all the evidence is consid-
ered, the trier of fact remains uncertain on the point [in the degree required by
the standard of proof used].
Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88
Yale L.J. 1325, 1329 n.8 (1979).
4. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See infra note 27 for
various interpretations of this line of cases.
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these acts that he thought he was shooting a bear? If the jury finds this
evidence convincing, the prosecution will have difficulty proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to kill a human being
after all.
Believable defense evidence that is relevant to the mental state element
of the crime charged could increase the prosecutor's practical burden of
persuasion significantly. Such evidence might involve proof that the de-
fendant was intoxicated5 or mentally abnormal6 at the time he commit-
ted the criminal act. The defendant, however, generally will not be
permitted to put on this proof. Instead, various exclusionary rules will
protect the prosecution from an increased practical burden of persuasion.
Evidence of intoxication, for example, may be excluded completely on
the issue of mental state,7 or the defendant may be required to bear the
burden of persuasion despite the fact that an element of the crime is at
issue.' In some states9 intoxication is only admissible with regard to a
specific intent, 10 or when the evidence meets the test for an insanity de-
fense." In many states a defendant may not show that self-induced in-
toxication prevented his having the culpable mental state of
recklessness.' 2 While these examples are specific to intoxication, defend-
5. The term "intoxication" is meant to refer to "a disturbance of mental or physical
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body." Model Penal
Code § 2.08(5)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Such substances would include, of
course, both alcohol and other drugs. For a history of the common law's approach to
intoxication as a defense to crimes, see generally Hall, Intoxication and Criminal Respon-
sibility, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1045, 1046-54 (1944).
6. Various terms, such as "diminished capacity," "diminished responsibility" and
"insanity," have been employed in the criminal law to describe offenses based on mental
abnormality. To avoid the confusion caused by these different terms, and by the varia-
tions in the use of each one, this article will use the generic term "mental abnormality."
7. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 8.04 (Vernon 1974) (voluntary intoxication not a
defense).
8. See State v. Wilson, 234 Iowa 60, 76-77, 11 N.W.2d 737, 745-46 (1943); Hall,
supra note 5, at 1048, 1050. While putting the burden of persuasion on the defense is not,
strictly speaking, an "exclusionary rule," it has the similar effect of increasing the diffi-
culty for the defense. If the true exclusionary rules are not permitted, the question re-
mains whether the shift of burden is allowable; on this issue, see infra pt. II.B.3.
9. This Article often will refer to "state" interests. It should be noted, however, that
whatever powers or restrictions apply to the states in this context also apply to the federal
government as criminal prosecutor.
10. E.g., State v. Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 522-23, 587 P.2d 236, 241-42 (1978); State
v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 606, 213 S.E.2d 238, 244 (1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 903
(1976); State v. D'Amico, 136 Vt. 153, 156-57, 385 A.2d 1082, 1084-85 (1978); see Hall,
supra note 5, at 1048-52; Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 Colum. L. Rev.
1210, 1211-12 (1955); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1246-57 (1966).
11. E.g., State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 125, 232 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1977); see Greider
v. Duckworth, 701 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1983).
12. E.g., State v. Smith, 185 Conn. 63, 74 & n.10, 441 A.2d 84, 91 & n.10 (1981);
State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273, 1275-76 (Me. 1979); State v. Murphy, 185 N.J. Super. 72,
74-75, 447 A.2d 219, 220 (1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-7 (1983); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 17-A, § 37 (1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-8(b) (West 1982); see Model Penal Code
§ 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Model Penal Code § 2.08(2) comment at 5
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
NEGATIVING DEFENSES
ants seeking to show that mental abnormality precluded the formation of
the required mental state often encounter similar restrictions.' 3
Such bars to the introduction of defense evidence operate despite the
clear relevance of the evidence to the mental state element of the crime
charged, the competence of the defense witnesses and the excellence of
their observations. Rather, the evidence is barred generically: Exclud-
ing consideration of intoxication or mental abnormality is thought neces-
sary to ensure reliable factfinding, efficient factfinding or the
incapacitation of dangerous people. 14
Excluding evidence relevant to mental state probably does not offend
the letter of the Patterson rule. 5 That case could be interpreted as re-
quiring the prosecution to overcome only such evidence as the state al-
lows a defendant to introduce; if there were no allowable defense
evidence, the prosecution still would have to convince the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt of the persuasiveness of its own evidence on each ele-
ment of the offense, including, of course, mental state. On the other
hand, the Patterson rule and the burden of persuasion are rather hollow if
the factfinder does not hear major relevant evidence in the defense arse-
nal. The spirit of the Patterson rule is that it ought to be difficult to prove
the elements of a crime; this spirit affects any inquiry into the state's right
to exclude defense evidence relevant to such an element.
The following discussion adopts a traditional balancing approach in
examining whether the state constitutionally may exclude mental state
evidence based on intoxication or mental abnormality. Because the pros-
ecution will prove mental state by circumstantial evidence, the defendant
has a particularly strong interest in introducing his refutation. The issue
then becomes whether the state's interests in excluding the evidence are
even stronger. This Article suggests that the state's concern with reliable
and efficient factfinding, while compelling, sometimes actually is
thwarted by exclusion of defense evidence. In addition, state interests
can be served adequately by case-specific application of traditional tech-
niques such as cross-examination and cautionary instructions. Further,
the invocation of unreliability as the basis for exclusion of this evidence
may be a mask to the state's actual underlying concern-that dangerous
13. See, eg., State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 161, 568 P.2d 1054, 1059 (1977) (evidence
of mental abnormality not admissible outside of context of the insanity defense); Johnson
v. State, 292 Md. 405, 417-18, 421, 439 A.2d 542, 549-50, 552 (1982) (same); State v.
Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Minn. 1982) (same); State v. Roman, 168 NJ. Super.
344, 348-51, 403 A.2d 24, 26-28 (1979) (evidence of mental abnormality admissible for
insanity defense and to negative specific intent); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253-54
(R.I. 1981) (same); Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation, 66 Va. L. Rev. 427, 473-77 (1980)
(stating that some states admit evidence of mental abnormality only for insanity defense,
while others allow such evidence to negative specific intent).
14. See infra notes 76-79, 115, 137-39 and accompanying text.
15. The Patterson rule requires the prosecution to prove all definitional elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206
(1977).
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people ought to be incapacitated. This Article argues that alternative
means, such as expanding civil commitment possibilities and redefining
crimes, exist to serve this interest. It is questionable, of course, whether
these are less drastic than the exclusion of defense evidence and subse-
quent criminal conviction. If the alternatives are as unworkable, the ex-
clusion of evidence can continue as long as the incapacitation of
dangerous people is deemed compelling. Over-emphasizing the need for
incarceration, however, carries its own dangers: Such a course could
threaten the existence of all rights that might lead to the acquittal of
dangerous people, and thus profoundly alter the nature of our criminal
justice system.
The problems explored below are brought into focus, if not created, by
the juxtaposition of two twentieth-century developments in criminal law:
the increased emphasis on subjective guilt as a prerequisite for criminal
conviction and the insistence upon prosecutorial proof of the elements of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The convergence of these trends, in
the short term, may be responsible for some increase in the freeing of
dangerous people. The following examination suggests, however, that
society may be able to use the criminal sanction more appropriately and
still ensure its physical safety by exploring less orthodox approaches to
the problem of incapacitation.
I. THE PATTERSON DECISION AND THE DYNAMICS OF DEFENSES
In Patterson v. New York16 the defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder after the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had caused the death of another person and that he had in-
tended to cause that death.17 The conviction would have been lowered to
manslaughter if the defendant had persuaded the jury that he had "acted
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance," a burden he bore
under New York law."8 The United States Supreme Court, faced with
the defendant's due process challenge to the allocation of the burden of
persuasion on this mitigating factor, condoned placing the burden of per-
suasion on the defendant, and thus affirmed the conviction. "The death,
the intent to kill, and causation are the facts that the State is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt if a person is to be convicted of murder.
No further facts are either presumed or inferred in order to constitute the
crime."19 The issue of extreme emotional disturbance "does not serve to
negative any facts of the crime which the State is to prove in order to
convict of murder. It constitutes a separate issue ... ."0 The state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements in the definition of the
16. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
17. Id. at 198-200.
18. Id. at 200.
19. Id. at 205-06.
20. Id. at 207.
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offense, and thus satified due process.2 '
In arriving at this holding the Court used the term "affirmative de-
fense" to refer to a defense that "does not serve to negative any facts of
the crime which the State is to prove."' Another way to state the
Court's holding, then, is that the due process clause permits a state to
make the defendant carry the burden of persuasion on an "affirmative
defense." This use of the term "affirmative defense," however, is slightly
different from that which is often found in the literature. Usually that
label is given to any defense for which the state has chosen to place the
burden of persuasion on the defendant, 23 irrespective of whether or not
that defense serves to negative any facts of the crime which the state
must prove in order to convict. To avoid the confusion that might be
caused by these inconsistent uses of the term "affirmative defense," this
Article uses the term "negativing defenses" for those defenses which, if
believed, preclude the existence of elements of the offense.24 Arguments
that exculpate despite the state's ability to prove all definitional elements
will be called "extrinsic defenses." Thus, the label "extrinsic" normally
would be given to such defenses as duress, protection of property and
self-defense;25 mistake of fact and alibi would be classic negativing de-
fenses.2 6 In these terms, then, Patterson could be seen as holding that the
state must bear the burden of persuasion on negativing, but not extrinsic
defenses.2 7
21. Id. at 206.
22. Id. at 207.
23. See, eg., W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 152 (1972); Jeffries & Stephan,
supra note 3, at 1335 n.17.
24. From this description, and from the following examples, it may be clear that the
term "negativing defenses" is being used for one application of what, in evidence law, is
called the rule of logical relevance: Evidence is logically relevant to proving or disprov-
ing mental state, for example, if after the evidence is introduced "the existence of [that
state of mind appears] more or less probable than it did before the evidence was offlered."
R. Lempert & S. Saltzberg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 142 (1977); see Fed. R.
Evid. 401; G. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence §10, at 21 (1978). "Negativ-
ing evidence," then, is logically relevant evidence that makes the existence of the mental
state less probable.
25. Note that these defenses would not be "extrinsic" under the broad approach to
general intent. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. While there may be some
constitutional issues involved in the extrinsic defenses (such as whether some specific
defenses are constitutionally required by such concepts as proportionality), this Article
focuses on problems concerned with the negativing defenses.
26. This Article will examine a defendant's constitutional right to present certain de-
fenses that negative the required mental state. A similar analysis could be undertaken
with regard to defenses that arguably negative the act element in the definition of a crime.
Alibi is such a defense, since a defendant who was elsewhere could not have performed
the criminal act. "Involuntary act" may be such a defense if the notion of voluntariness
is implicitly part of the definition of the crime, but see the discussion of the nature of the
"reasonable person" aspect of objective mental state, infra notes 191-92 and accompany-
ing text.
27. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court held that the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the
defendant] is charged." Id. at 364. There are many ways to interpret this language. A
1984]
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Evidence of mental abnormality is potentially of either type, depending
on the specific facts and the charge involved.28 Assume a murder statute,
such as the one in Patterson, in which the crime is defined as intention-
ally causing the death of another human being. A psychotic who per-
ceived his attacker to be a bear and killed it, only to discover later that he
had killed a person, would have a negativing defense: If the jury believed
his evidence, the prosecution could not prove "intent to kill a human
being." A psychotic who believed that God was commanding him to kill
that person, however, would not have a negativing defense: Even if the
jurors believed his evidence, they could still conclude that he had the
"procedural" interpretation, see Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1333-38, would re-
quire the state to prove "not only the presence of every element of the offense but also the
absence of justification, excuse, or other grounds of exculpation or mitigation." Id. at
1333. This interpretation has been heavily criticized, mainly on the ground that it would
discourage legislatures from experimenting in law reform. See id. at 1344-60; cf. Allen,
The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal
Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 30, 34-35 (1977) (procedural inter-
pretation would invalidate attempts to allocate burden of persuasion to defendant, thus
eliminating affirmative defenses from criminal law).
A second interpretation, taking off from this concern, is labeled by Allen the "political
compromise" approach. It would permit placing the burden of persuasion on the defend-
ant when "the legislature would have refused to adopt the defense but for the provision
imposing the burden of proof on the defendant." Allen, supra, at 50-51.
A third interpretation, labeled "substantive" by Jeffries and Stephan, focuses on the
notion of proportionality. It requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "facts
sufficient to justify penalties of the sort contemplated. In other words . . . [there is] a
constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a constitutionally ade-
quate basis for imposing the punishment authorized." Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at
1365. Thus, the courts should review whether the maximum punishment authorized for
a particular crime "is grossly disproportionate to the conduct and culpability proved by
the state." Id. at 1381. If the punishment is proportionate, "its adequacy is not impaired
by legislative adoption of the more generous scheme of an affirmative defense." Id. at
1382. Allen, agreeing, points out that the state would only be required to disprove an
extrinsic defense when "a statute removes from the definition of a crime those elements
that make it serious in the first place," adding, in a footnote, "[a]s would be the case, for
example, if the defense of entrapment or insanity were viewed as negating intent." Allen,
supra, at 52 & n.80.
The most restrictive interpretation of In re Winship is a formalistic or "elements" ap-
proach. This interpretation assumes that the state need prove beyond a reasonable doubt
only those elements of the offense that it chooses to include in the definition of the crime.
See Allen, supra, at 48. While it can be debated whether Patterson adopted a "substan-
tive" or "elements" approach, see Allen, supra, at 48-53, this Article will proceed on the
assumption that the most restrictive, "elements," approach was chosen by that case. This
assumption will be made because the "elements" approach is the least helpful to defend-
ants wanting to avoid the burden of persuasion of a particular matter, and yet, as will be
seen, the defendant nevertheless must be allowed to avoid that burden when his evidence
of mental abnormality or intoxication negatives the existence of a required mental state.
28. Whether a defendant's mental abnormality did preclude the formation of a re-
quired mental state is a factual question probably only answered with the aid of a psy-
chologist or psychiatrist. This Article is not intended to survey the types of psychological
conditions that can cause delusional states, nor to critique the theories and methodologies
used by practitioners to diagnose such conditions. Development of a negativing defense
would be the task of the defense attorney and experts in each particular case. This Arti-
cle is intended merely to examine the admissibility of such negativing evidence once it is
developed.
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intent to kill a human being. He might, however, have an extrinsic de-
fense, depending on the jurisdiction's insanity test.29
Many jurisdictions refuse to acknowledge this distinction, requiring
that negativing evidence of mental abnormality be treated as an extrinsic
"insanity" defense rather than as evidence pertaining to the existence of
the requisite mental state.3" This rule, and others like it,3 will be af-
fected by the balancing considered below.
Evidence of intoxication also is potentially either negativing or extrin-
sic. 2 Assuming the same statute as above, a defendant whose intoxica-
tion made him unaware of how fast or erratically he was driving would
not, if he hit a pedestrian, have "intended" to kill a human being.33 If,
29. The classic M'Naghten test of criminal insanity requires proof that the defendant
"at the time of the committing of the act. . . was labouring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). In a jurisdic-
tion using this test, an extrinsic defense in the noted hypothetical would be the defend-
ant's belief that the act was not wrong because God had commanded it. In a jurisdiction
adding a "control test," where "the focus. . . is on mental disease that deprives the
individual of the capacity to exercise his will, the capacity to choose whether or not to
engage in proscribed behavior," P. Low, J. Jeffries & R. Bonnie, Criminal Law 657-58
(1982), an extrinsic defense would be that the defendant felt powerless to disobey God's
command.
30. See supra note 13.
31. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
32. Whether a defendant's intoxication did preclude the formation of a required
mental state is a factual question probably only answered with the aid of an expert on
intoxicated states. As the knowledge in this area is limited and the experts few, it is this
author's impression that convincing negativing evidence based on intoxication is rarely
developed. On the assumption, however, that such development sometimes would be
possible, this Article is intended to examine the admissibility of such negativing evidence
once it exists.
33. While it commonly is accepted that ingestion of alcohol loosens inhibition, see
Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. Ill. L.F. 1, 4 (1961), it also is true
that a high level of intoxication can prevent subjective awareness of external reality.
As a matter of logic the fact of acute alcoholic intoxication may ground an
inference that the actor did not act with the knowledge or purpose or reckless-
ness required as the element of a crime. Alcohol acts as a depressant and, in
large amounts, can seriously interfere with the drinker's perceptive capacity and
mental powers. With 0.30 per cent or more of alcohol in the blood (the
equivalent of a pint of whisky in the body) a drinker's sensory perception is
quite dulled and he has little comprehension of what he sees, hears or feels.
Model Penal Code § 2.08 comment at 3 n.4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) (citations omitted).
Awareness of external reality also can be affected by ingestion of other drugs, such as
LSD, see Comment, LSD-Its Effects on Criminal Responsibility, 17 De Paul L Rev.
365, 366 (1968), or heroin, from which hallucinations are possible during the second, or
euphoric, stage of the reaction, which may last from two to three hours, Interview with
Dr. Jerry Larson, Physician for Comprehensive Options for Drug Abusers, Inc. (CODA)
Drug Treatment Program, in Portland, Or. (Feb. 9, 1984).
Of course, the fact that such negativing evidence theoretically is possible does not mean
that it is easy to present the evidence or convince the jury to accept it. For example,
"[t]he defendant's assertion that drinking had taken away his capacity to form an intent
is often disbelieved because of his glib exculpatory statements to investigating policemen
about his actions at the time of the crime." Paulsen, supra, at 9. It is beyond the scope of
1984]
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however, that same defendant had seen someone he hated walking across
the street and purposely had struck that victim with his car, his argu-
ment that he would not have carried out that intent if sober would be, at
best, an extrinsic defense.
A common aspect of the foregoing examples is that the prosecution
was required to prove subjective culpability. In fact, as will be explored
further below,34 mental abnormality and intoxication can be negativing
defenses only to subjective mental state requirements: intent, purpose,
knowledge, and in some cases35 recklessness. If the prosecution can con-
vict merely on proof of objective culpability (that is, negligence), mental
abnormality and intoxication will be irrelevant.3 6
In summary, when a subjective mental state is an element, the prosecu-
tor must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, if the defense is per-
mitted to introduce negativing evidence of mental abnormality or
intoxication, and that evidence is believed by the factfinder, the prosecu-
tion's task necessarily will include overcoming whatever doubts the de-
fense evidence has raised about the existence of the required mental state.
This approach would, in effect, require the prosecution to disprove the
defendant's evidence, 37 a possibly formidable task. If the prosecutor
failed, the consequences could be severe: A person whose mental abnor-
mality or intoxication had resulted in dangerous behavior might be out
on the street and capable of again causing harm.
II. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT NEGATIVING EVIDENCE
The dynamic outlined in the previous section assumes, of course, that
the defendant has a right to present evidence whenever it would negative
an element of the offense. As noted above," the basis for such a defense
this Article to discuss the details of the type of evidence that would be successful in
negativing the mental state requirements.
34. See infra pt. II.C.l.b.
35. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
36. This will be so because the evidence will not make the existence of the required
elements less probable. See supra note 24 and infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
37. Various courts have accepted this logic. See, e.g., People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d
318, 321-22, 583 P.2d 1308, 1310, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 267-68 (1978) (when defendant has
evidence that he lacked the specific intent required for burglary because he was under the
delusion that he himself owned the burgled apartment, he must be allowed to introduce
that evidence on the issue of mental state rather than be forced to treat it as an insanity
defense); Ward v. State, 438 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ind. 1982) (when defendant introduces
mental state evidence which would reduce murder to manslaughter, the prosecution bears
the burden of proving that that mental state did not exist) (dictum); State v. Stockett, 278
Or. 637, 644-45, 565 P.2d 739, 743 (1977) (unconstitutional to put burden of persuasion
of negativing defense on defendant, but harmless error because the defendant's evidence
did not negative any element in the definition of the crime); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d
1251, 1255 (R.I. 1981) (where defendant seeks, under the "diminished capacity" doc-
trine, to establish the absence of an element of the crime, the state must overcome the
effort by proof beyond a reasonable doubt) (dictum).
38. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
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right must be found in sources other than Patterson v. New York.39
There is precedent for the proposition that a defendant has a constitu-
tional right to present evidence." The cases and commentators are un-
clear regarding the source of that right 4 1-whether it is the due process
clauses42 or the sixth amendment.43 All agree that the right is not abso-
lute, and that a balancing test weighing the competing interests of the
defendant and the government should be used to determine whether it is
constitutional for the government on any particular occasion to burden
the right to defend."
There is no clear consensus as to the nature of the balancing test that
should be employed. Commentators seem to agree, however, that the
test must recognize that the state's side of the balance can vary not only
according to the nature of the interest asserted, but also with the means
used to achieve stated ends. For example, Professor Clinton suggests
that the government's interest is weakened to the extent that it has not
adopted the least restrictive alternative that will further its goals:
Presumably, as part of the analysis of the governmental interest ad-
vanced, some inquiry must be made as to whether the evidentiary or
procedural objectives justifying the infringement of the accused's con-
stitutional rights might not be furthered by means which less drasti-
cally undermine the accused's ability to present a defense. To the
extent that less drastic alternatives are available, the governmental in-
terest infringing on the right to present a defense is less compelling.4 5
Professor Westen, using much the same language, goes further and as-
serts that the alternative need only adequately, rather than completely,
serve the state's interest:
The "alternative means" analysis. . . prohibits the state from further-
ing its interests by burdening constitutional rights where less drastic
alternatives adequately serve its interests. A less drastic alternative is
adequate by that analysis, even if less effective, if the added effective-
ness of the more drastic alternative is insufficient to justify the latter's
39. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
40. Kg., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
41. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee
in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 792-93 (1976).
42. Id. Clinton rejects grounding the right in the sixth amendment because, accord-
ing to his reading of the constitutional history, such grounding would entail reliance on
the "penumbras" of that amendment. He favors the due process clauses because of their
inherent flexibility, which, he claims, will allow the right to develop with no artificial
barriers deriving from the language of the amendment. Id. at 794-95.
43. See Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71 (1974). Westen
thinks that the constitutional history and inferences from it support grounding the right
in the sixth amendment compulsory process clause. Id. at 182-84. The Seventh Circuit,
without discussion, has grounded such a right in the sixth amendment. Hughes v. Ma-
thews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
44. Clinton, supra note 41, at 797-800, 810; Westen, supra note 43, at 133-46, 156.
45. Clinton, supra note 41, at 800 (footnote omitted).
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burden on constitutional rights.
4 6
Because the balance demands subtlety, the test in substantive due pro-
cess analysis is attractive here. It allows both a differentiation between
ends and means and a ranking of the asserted modes and interests in each
category. The test provides that if an individual's interests are funda-
mental they can only be outweighed by protecting compelling state inter-
ests by necessary means; when an individual's interests are otherwise, the
state will be allowed to pursue legitimate goals using any rational
method.4 v
46. Westen, supra note 43, at 149 (emphasis in original).
47. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Constitutional Law 448 (2d ed. 1983). As
indicated, see supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text, commentators seem to assume
the appropriateness of a strict scrutiny test in this area, perhaps because the right to
defend is seen as fundamental. If a strict scrutiny test were rejected, of course, a state's
decision to limit or exclude negativing evidence would be a "rational" way to achieve its
goal. The logical conclusion of this approach, of course, could be conviction upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of dangerousness.
In Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983), the court essentially used a substan-
tive due process approach in the context of the defendant's asserted sixth and fourteenth
amendment right to introduce evidence that a state court had ruled would necessitate too
much time or present the risk of undue prejudice. The Ninth Circuit apparently would
refuse to see the defendant's right as "fundamental" if his evidence was cumulative, unre-
liable or weakly probative. See id. at 1452-53. On the other hand, the state's interest in
"reliable and efficient trials" was seen as always "compelling," id. at 1451, unless the
state was utilizing an irrational rule, id. at 1451-53. The court did not have to reach the
question of the rationality of the state's rule in the Perry case, as it found the defendant's
evidence to be weak. Id. at 1454.
The Ninth Circuit's approach appears quite heavily weighted in favor of the state.
Once the court labels defense evidence "cumulative," "unreliable" or "weak," that evi-
dence can be excluded as long as exclusion is rational. The state is never forced to use
the least restrictive alternative. Difficulties inherent in convincing a court to label rules of
procedure "irrational" also would result in frequent rejection of the defense evidence.
It can be argued that in order for a defendant's right to present a defense to be mean-
ingful, doubts about probative value must be resolved in the defendant's, not the state's,
favor. This argument can be made with special strength when the evidence is not collat-
eral, as, for example, would be evidence going to a witness's credibility. It also can be
more strongly made when the evidence is negativing rather than extrinsic, since the in-
ability of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime precludes the need for extrin-
sic defenses at all. That negativing evidence demands special consideration is reflected in
the contrast between the Supreme Court's constitutional treatment of the negativing evi-
dence in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), and the extrinsic evidence in Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). See infra notes 68, 127-30 and accompanying text.
One might be tempted to argue that the difference in constitutional importance be-
tween negativing and extrinsic evidence is reflected adequately in the state's ability to
shift the burden of persuasion on extrinsic defenses to the defendant or to eliminate them
altogether. An anomaly would result, however, if this argument were accepted. A court
might be more likely to allow low-reliability evidence on an issue where the defendant
bears the burden of proof, on the theory that the allocation of the burden will protect the
jury from having to rely on such evidence. If that were to happen, evidence of similar
reliability would be excluded on the constitutionally mandated defense and admitted on
defenses that have not as yet clearly been constitutionally required.
It also should be noted that use of a strict scrutiny test implicates exclusionary rules
beyond those discussed here. Assume, for example, that Joe confessed to his lawyer that
he had committed the crime with which Mary was charged. If Mary discovered this,
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This section will examine first why the defendant has a fundamental
interest in introducing evidence of intoxication or mental abnormality to
negative mental state. Following will be an exploration of the state inter-
ests commonly thought to justify exclusion of such evidence: an interest
in reliable and efficient factfinding and an interest in incapacitating dan-
gerous individuals. Each of these latter interests, in turn, will be evalu-
ated on two levels: Is the interest itself compelling? If so, has the state
employed a necessary or least intrusive method of furthering the inter-
est?a" Both questions must be answered affirmatively before either inter-
est may be said to outweigh the fundamental interest held by a
defendant.
A. The Defendant's Interest
A defendant's interest in introducing relevant49 evidence on the issue
of mental state relates directly to the manner in which the prosecution
proves criminal charges. An act or result is capable of proof by direct
evidence: A witness may testify to having seen the defendant shoot the
victim, and the only question will be whether the witness is worthy of
should she be allowed to force Joe's lawyer to testify as to that privileged communication
on the grounds that it negatived the act element in the charge against her? Use of the
strict scrutiny approach does not, of course, automatically result in an affirmative answer.
Other interests may be "compelling," and exclusion of the evidence may be the least
intrusive possible solution. The exploration of the numerous rules that may be implicated
by the use of a strict scrutiny test in the current context is beyond the scope of this
Article.
48. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 47, at 448; see also id. at 592
(similar test used in equal protection cases involving limitations on the exercise of funda-
mental rights); cf Clinton, supra note 41, at 814-15 ("the application of the least restric-
tive alternative doctrine. . . diminishes the government's asserted interest in reliability"
with regard to polygraph evidence).
49. It must be emphasized that the remainder of the Article is limited to defense
evidence that actually is logically relevant to the existence of the required mental state.
The evidence may be considered irrelevant if it is based on expert testimony that does not
meet the minimum standards for accuracy of "novel" scientific evidence. See Comment,
The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 Md. L. Rev. 539, 562
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Expert itness]. But see Clinton, supra note 41, at 810-15
(even evidence that fails to meet minimum standards for scientific evidence may have to
be admitted when proffered by the defendant). Assuming, however, that the evidence
meets this threshold or is not subject to it, it will be logically relevant if it shows that
"because of intoxication or endogenous causes, [the defendant] lacked the conscious
awareness, belief, or intention required by the substantive law." Bonnie & Slobogin,
supra note 13, at 446 (labeling such a defense "diminished capacity"). Negativing evi-
dence does not include facts leading to the argument of "diminished responsibility"-that
"a person suffering from severe mental disorder should not be regarded as fully responsi-
ble for his offense, even if he is not legally insane and even if he had the mens rea required
for the offense." Id. at 449. Nor will it include proof that a defendant could not control
his behavior. It should also be noted that the fact that the evidence is circumstantial does
not make it less relevant, especially on the issue of mental state. See supra pt. II.A; cf.
Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 86 n.46, 87 (D.C. 1976) (psychiatric testimony is
of general relevance to issue of responsibility; issue of existence of the required state of
mind must be determined by the circumstances of the case), cerL denied, 433 U.S. 911
(1977).
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belief. Mental state, however, can never be so proved unless it is admit-
ted by the defendant. The state will of necessity have to argue, for exam-
ple, that because the defendant pointed a loaded gun at point-blank range
at the victim's chest and pulled the trigger, he must have intended to kill
that person. Proof will be by circumstantial evidence, frequently consist-
ing only of the fact that the defendant committed the bad act or caused
the bad result.5"
This sort of proof works because most jurors, like people in general,
are willing to assume that a person who acts in a certain way intends
both his behavior and whatever results naturally flow from such behav-
ior. This conclusion will be virtually automatic unless something causes
the juror to question it in a particular context. If the only context avail-
able is that presented by the prosecution's evidence of the act and result,
there will be no inclination to question the conclusion that the defendant
intended both. Only if the defense is allowed to present an alternative or
enriched context, such as the defendant's mental abnormality, will the
jury have any reason to explore further the defendant's intent to do the
act or cause the result. 5'
The same point can be made in slightly different terms. Proof of
mental state involves using the "reasonable person" as circumstantial ev-
50. Unless the prosecutor meets the burden of production on the act elements of the
crime, the case will not go to the jury anyway. Thus, the minimum circumstantial evi-
dence of mental state will be the defendant's acts. It should also be noted that if, in the
context of the prosecutor's evidence, the inference that the defendant intended the conse-
quences of his acts is an irrational one, the jury might not be allowed to make that infer-
ence. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). Allen states a rule of logical
relevance for inferences and substitutes the word "rational" for the requirement of factual
relevance. If evidence is relevant, the jury can hear it; if an inference is rational, its use
can be sanctioned openly by the court or prosecutor; in both cases, the factfinder then
must decide if the inference proves the element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
See id. at 164-67.
51. See Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S.
801 (1978). The court there stated that when the state court instructs the jury that there
is a rebuttable presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences
of his own acts, exclusion of psychiatric evidence on the issue of mental state is unconsti-
tutional. This is so because, despite the defendant's ability to rebut the presumption with
other evidence, the exclusion in effect creates a "conclusive presumption which relieves
the state of its duty to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The court would have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the jury instruction,
holding exclusion of the psychiatric evidence per se unconstitutional. Id. at 1255; see
also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 700-01 (1975) (relieving the state of its burden to
prove elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt could result in conviction of the
innocent).
Bonnie and Slobogin go so far as to state that the use of circumstantial evidence to
prove mental state
has the practical effect of shifting the burden to the defendant to demonstrate
that he did not perceive, believe, expect, or intend what an ordinary person
would have perceived, believed, expected, or intended under the same circum-
stances. Restriction of clinical testimony on mens rea thus compromises the
defendant's opportunity to present a defense on an issue concerning which he,
in reality, bears the burden of proof.
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 477 (footnotes omitted).
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idence: If the reasonable person would have been aware that somebody
was standing in front of the gun, the defendant must also have had that
awareness absent evidence to the contrary. The "reasonable person" test,
however, can also be a standard of culpability. In other words, the law
can force someone, at his peril, to act as though he had the awareness a
reasonable person would have had in the same external circumstances.
Such a standard is labeled "negligence";52 when it is imposed, the subjec-
tive, actual awareness of the defendant is irrelevant.5 3
The exclusion of negativing evidence on the issue of mental state has
the effect of "selectively redefining the offense to apply objective stan-
dards to [that particular defendant] and subjective standards to everyone
else."54 This is so because the defendant's actual awareness, affected by
intoxication or mental abnormality, is deemed irrelevant. The defendant
is precluded from showing what he did, in fact, intend, and the jury will
hold him to the level of awareness of a reasonable person. Thus, the
defendant, despite his mental state, is found guilty on objective stan-
dards. Other defendants, unaffected by intoxication or mental abnormal-
ity at the time of the offense, also might fail to provide a challenge to the
"reasonable person" logic. If so, however, the failure will be because no
challenge exists-that is, because they are subjectively liable.
While it may be the case that, upon reflection, the legislature wants to
allow criminal liability for negligent behavior,55 "selectively redefining
the offense" 56 so that an objective standard affects only mentally abnor-
mal or intoxicated actors is a substantially different matter. If nothing
else, such concealed redefinition permits the illusion that the defendant
was convicted on the basis of a subjective mental state, and so permits
the enhanced punishment attendant upon such increased culpability. 57
The defendant's interest in introducing negativing evidence also coin-
cides with an institutional interest in ensuring adequate review of police
and prosecutorial practices. The administrative process leading up to a
decision to charge the defendant is essentially a secret one. Explanations
other than the one ultimately adopted by the police and prosecutor either
have not been considered at all or have been rejected, perhaps for reasons
having nothing to do with the actual guilt or innocence of the defend-
ant.58 The "presumption of innocence" is a systemic check on this ad-
52. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) comment at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959).
54. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 479; see Paulsen, supra note 33, at 14-15; cf
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-thy Not?, 72 Yale LJ. 853, 870
(1963) ("[A]nother low visibility purpose of the insanity defense ... is to keep sufli-
ciently ambiguous the consequences of the defense [i.e., incapacitation]. . . so as to pre-
vent at least conscious recognition that the prerequisites of criminal liability have been
abandoned.")
55. See infra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
56. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 479.
57. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
58. It is commonplace that prosecutors have broad charging discretion that is virtu-
ally unreviewable until the defendant has a chance to participate in some court proceed-
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ministrative process, directing the state to jump through a certain
number of hoops no matter how apparent the defendant's guilt.59 Re-
view by an independent factfinder is the major way of examining the ad-
ministrative decisions of police and prosecutors. 60 Excluding relevant
evidence from the trial precludes adequate review and makes the "hoop"
illusory.6'
Ineffective public review of administrative decisions is disturbing be-
cause it indicates a break in the chain that connects the criminal justice
system with society's underlying moral precepts. Herbert Packer has ob-
served that among the unarticulated assumptions underlying the "rela-
tively stable and enduring features of the American legal system" 62 is the
notion that "the alleged criminal is not merely an object to be acted upon
but an independent entity in the process who may, if he so desires, force
the operators of the process to demonstrate to an independent authority
(judge and jury) that he is guilty of the charges against him."'63 Ameri-
cans, in other words, commonly perceive the punishment of convicted
criminals as the last step in a process in which defendants are protected
from the unilateral and potentially arbitrary imposition of sanctions by
police and prosecutors. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, "to com-
mand the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law . . .[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
ing. Prosecutors who believe that criminal prosecution is inappropriate, despite the
existence of incriminating evidence, can refuse to prosecute. National College of District
Attorneys, Special Problems in Prosecution 39 (J. Douglass ed. 1977); National District
Attorneys Assn., National Prosecution Standards 131 (1977); United States Dept. of Jus-
tice, Principles of Federal Prosecution 6-7 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Principles of Prose-
cution]. It is conceivable that some prosecutors, knowing that the defendant lacked the
required mental state because of intoxication or mental abnormality, would reject crimi-
nal prosecution in favor of civil commitment or diversion into treatment. Other prosecu-
tors, however, might be unaware of such exculpatory or mitigating factors. The evidence
might not be carefully scrutinized before charging, or might be presented by biased police
officers to sympathetic prosecutors. F. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a
Suspect With a Crime 16-19 (1969); see H. Packer, Limits of the Criminal Sanction 293
(1968). The prosecutor also could decide that the state should prosecute any case where
the inculpatory evidence meets either the "probable cause" or the "directed verdict" stan-
dard. See F. Miller, supra, at 22; Principles of Prosecution, supra, at 6. There have even
been cases where prosecutors, for reasons of ego or time pressure, have supressed excul-
patory evidence at crucial times. See Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct in
the Federal System, 71 J. Crim. Law and Criminology 1, 23-24 (1980). "If police or
prosecutors find themselves free. . . to pick and choose among known or knowable in-
stances of criminal conduct, they are making a judgment which [substitutes] the personal
and often idiosyncratic values of the law enforcer [for community values expressed
through legislation]." H. Packer, supra, at 290.
59. H. Packer, supra note 58, at 161-63.
60. See id. at 205-10.
61. "It is inconsistent with fundamental principles of American jurisprudence to pre-
clude an accused from offering relevant and competent evidence to dispute the charge
against him. This, of course, includes any of the elements that comprise that charge."
Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 223, 360 A.2d 914, 921 (1976).
62. H. Packer, supra note 58, at 155.
63. Id. at 157.
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not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned."'
We would not be comfortable, for example, if we were told that our
criminal justice system absolutely prevented a defendant from showing
that he was in Tahiti at the time the charged crime took place in Des
Moines. To put the point bluntly, it is hypocritical, at best, to glory in
the confidence that the administrative conclusion of guilt has been re-
viewed when the outcome of that review is predetermined.
When a mental state element exists, a defendant is not culpable unless
he is proved to have the required mental state.65 Mental state is as im-
portant an element, in terms of the moral justification for the criminal
sanction, as is the criminal act.66 If we are uncomfortable about a de-
fendant being precluded from showing that he did not perform the act,
there is no reason why we should view defense evidence on mental state
any differently.
If the defendant's evidence is excluded, it need not be met; if it is al-
lowed, the prosecution can meet it, at least, by showing that it is unrelia-
ble.68 Unless doubts about admitting the evidence are resolved in the
defendant's favor, too much essentially unreviewable discretion will be
allowed to the prosecution, and the "hoop" that makes up a good part of
the presumption of innocence will be a mere formality.
To summarize the discussion thus far, the defendant's interest in intro-
ducing evidence that negatives mental state must be deemed fundamental
for two reasons. First, a subjective mental state requirement can be
meaningful only if the defendant is allowed to introduce negativing evi-
dence. Second, review of administrative decisions is enhanced by consid-
eration of the defendant's evidence. There is also a third reason: Uitless
the defendant's interests are labeled "fundamental," the weakest of legiti-
mate state interests will outweigh them when the balancing test is ap-
64. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (discussing importance of requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
65. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977).
66. See generally, H. Packer, supra note 58, at 103-06 (discussing why conduct alone,
without a mens rea, is an insufficient element for criminal liability).
67. It might be argued that acts are more concrete than mental state, and thus are
more easily determined by a jury. This is basically an argument that the jury is incapable
of sifting through the vagaries of circumstantial evidence and therefore must be protected
from too many conflicting interpretations. It is an argument that reveals a profound
mistrust of juries and, concomitantly, an extreme trust in the police-prosecutorial admin-
istrative process. It is also an argument that overlooks the fact that the state, with its vast
resources, is quite capable of meeting defense evidence on mental state directly.
68. There is the chance, of course, that the prosecution might be unable to overcome
the defendant's evidence. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), however, the
Court rejected the notion that "the difficulties in negating an argument that the homicide
was committed in the heat of passion" justified making the defendant bear the burden of
persuasion as to the negativing defense. Id. at 701-02. The Court pointed out that, diffi-
cult or not, placing the burden on the prosecutor is deemed essential to our criminal
justice system. Id. at 701. This is so even on an element, such as "intent," that "is
typically considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant." Id. at 702.
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plied. On the other hand, labeling defense interests "fundamental" will
not result in the virtually automatic discounting of state interests. Im-
portant state goals will be labeled "compelling," and the inquiry can then
focus on the more subtle question of the appropriate means of reaching
those goals.
B. The State's Interest in Reliable and Efficient Factfinding
As noted earlier, existing rules often preclude or burden defendants'
attempts to introduce evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication on
the issue of mental state.69 Courts frequently explain these rules as nec-
essary to ensure the reliability and efficiency of the factfinding process.7"
The state surely has a valid interest in exercising enough control over
trials to avoid unnecessary confusion of issues and inaccurate results.
The state also has a valid interest in promoting efficient trials that avoid
waste of valuable judicial and related resources. Conceding these points,
however, is not an admission that negativing evidence of intoxication or
mental abnormality can be excluded. Two issues arise: Are state inter-
ests in reliability and efficiency "compelling," and, if so, what are the
least intrusive means of serving them? This Article will explore these
issues in turn, and then will balance the results.
1. Is the Interest "Compelling"?
The state's interest in reliable and efficient factfinding is legitimate.7
The nature of the balancing test used here7" affords two good reasons to
label the interest "compelling" as well. One involves the consequences of
failing to do so. Assume, for example, that the defense were to offer, on
the issue of mental state, a neophyte psychologist who had "examined"
the defendant for five minutes and had never before testified in court.
This evidence would be unreliable. The state, however, would not be
able to overcome the defendant's fundamental right7 3 to introduce this
evidence if its own interest in doing so were merely "legitimate." The
state would lose control over the trial process whenever a defendant
wanted to introduce negativing evidence, however cumulative or unrelia-
ble it might be. On the other hand, if the state's interest is deemed "com-
69. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 89-90 (D.C. 1976) (evidence unre-
liable on subtle distinctions between specific mental states), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911
(1977); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 96-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13-14 (1980) (same); cf. Bates
v. State, 386 A.2d 1139, 1142-44 (Del. 1978) (rejecting doctrine of "diminished responsi-
bility" and adopting the Bethea rationale).
71. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983). As discussed earlier, see
supra note 47, the Perry court also considered this legitimate interest to be compelling.
Perry, 713 F.2d at 1451.
72. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
73. It will be recalled that, among other reasons, the defendant's right was labeled
"fundamental" so that it could compete successfully with the state's noncompelling but
legitimate interests. See supra pt. II.A.
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pelling," the state will be able to exclude the evidence if exclusion is
necessary to ensure the reliability and efficiency of this particular trial.
The second reason involves the fact that resolution of evidentiary mat-
ters, and the trial process itself, have traditionally been seen as state con-
cerns; vindication of a defendant's constitutional rights, on the other
hand, is often the concern of the federal courts. This means that there is
some delicacy involved in balancing interests in this area. "In our federal
system, states have always retained considerable freedom in adopting
procedures for their own courts. . . . We 'should not lightly construe
the Constitution so as to intrude upon the administration of justice by the
individual States.' "' Failure to label the state's interest in reliability and
efficiency as "compelling" could itself be a thorn in the side of federalism.
Beyond the slight such failure would connote, however, is the fact that it
is easier for the federal courts to "intrude upon"-and in fact to discount
completely-state interests labeled merely "legitimate." Bestowing the
label "compelling" will ensure that some means will be found to further
the state interests here.
2. The Least Intrusive Means
Although the state's interests in reliability and efficiency may be "com-
pelling," they do not justify the blanket exclusion of negativing evidence
unless that is the least intrusive means of furthering those interests."
This Article will now explore the specific nature of the reliability and
efficiency interests and what alternative means exist to serve them.
a. Reliability
Courts typically apply the label "unreliable" to evidence of mental ab-
normality and intoxication whenever it is proferred on the issue of
mental state; exclusion of the evidence accompanies the label.76 When
74. Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Patterson v.
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977)) (citations omitted). In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. 684 (1975), the Court's rationale could have been interpreted to require the prosecu-
tion to bear the burden of persuasion on extrinsic defenses. The Court retreated from this
position in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). Fletcher sees this retreat, and
the Patterson decision in general, as based on principles of federalism rather than as a
doctrinal endorsement of placing the burden of persuasion on a defendant. G. Fletcher,
Rethinking Criminal Law § 7.3.4, at 551 (1978).
It goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the
business of the States than it is of the Federal Government ... .and that we
should not lightly construe the Constitution so as to intrude upon the adminis-
tration of justice by the individual States. Among other things, it is normally
"within the power of the State to regulate procedures under which its laws are
carried out.. .. "
Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958)) (cita-
tion omitted).
75. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
76. See, eg., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 89-90 (D.C. 1976). cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (1977); Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 96-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13-14 (1980).
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the label is misapplied, the resulting exclusion prevents the jury from
hearing reliable defense evidence, and thus is counter-productive of the
professed interest itself. Misapplication of the label "unreliable" is in-
creased when blanket exclusions are declared for generic types of evi-
dence. Case-by-case determination of reliability is the less intrusive
alternative, and frequently something less than exclusion will suffice to
ensure reliability even on a case-by-case basis. These propositions will be
examined in turn.
The concern about reliability takes three forms when the issue is nega-
tiving evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication. First, the state
has an interest in preventing results based on counterfeit evidence." Sec-
ond, the state has an interest in excluding evidence in which the proba-
tive value is outweighed by the risk of prejudice.78 Third, the state has
an interest in reducing or eliminating evidence that might confuse or mis-
lead the jury.7 9 In analyzing these interests, the following discussions
assume that the state will be able to have its own experts examine a de-
fendant who uses negativing evidence based on mental abnormality or
intoxication. Were this not so, the arguments against the admission of
the defense evidence would be more compelling.8"
77. See infra pt. II.B.2.a.i.
78. See infra pt. II.B.2.a.ii.
79. See infra pt. II.B.2.a.iii.
80. The fifth amendment could preclude the state from examining the defendant be-
cause "a person who introduces evidence of his mental condition . . . makes no admis-
sion of the crime. . . . In such a situation the fifth amendment requires that the State
prove its case without compelling the defendant to submit to interviews by those in its
employ." State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, -, 345 N.W.2d 806, 813 (1984). A counter-
vailing argument recognizes the state's difficulty in meeting defense expert testimony ab-
sent a reciprocal examination of the defendant. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465
(1981). It follows from the latter argument that the defendant can be required to comply
with pre-trial notice requirements when he intends to assert such a defense. This ap-
proach could serve the interests of both parties by allowing the state's expert to examine
the defendant, but forbidding him to testify on any issue save that of mental state. See
United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1976) (insanity defense context, in
which court assumes sanity is an element of the offense); cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. at
468 ("A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to
introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if
his statement can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding."); Note, Requir-
ing a Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Inva-
sion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 648, 649 & n.9 (1970)
(stating that some courts prohibit using information from a psychiatric examination to
establish that defendant committed the acts charged) [hereinafter cited as Invasion]. Fo-
rensic reports also can be withheld from the prosecution until it is clear that the negativ-
ing defense will be used. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 500. It should be noted,
however, that there is some disagreement with the notion that lack of reciprocal examina-
tions prevents the state from refuting defense expert testimony on the issue of mental
state. State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. at -, 345 N.W.2d at 812; Invasion, supra, at 670-71. If
no state examination is allowed, there is, of course, no fifth amendment problem. If, as
these sources suggest, traditional litigation techniques will allow the state to meet the
defense evidence, a state-sponsored examination could be dispensed with without harm to
the state's reliability interests.
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i. The Danger of Counterfeit Evidence
In the context of evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication, the
interest in reliability is perhaps most commonly expressed in the fear that
such conditions are easy to fake.8 The defendant may so convincingly
feign intoxication or mental abnormality at the time of the crime that lay
witnesses will testify in court that the condition appeared to exist.8 2 The
defendant also may be able to fake the debilitating condition after the
fact when being examined by forensic experts.
One can question, however, the significance of a concern about manu-
factured evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication. Ultimately, the
focal question is whether the possibility of chicanery is so great that evi-
dence of mental abnormality or intoxication always must be precluded
on the issue of mental state.
Reasons exist for answering this question in the negative. Blanket ex-
clusion of the evidence presupposes either or both of two situations:
First, that the risk of counterfeiting is greater statistically for evidence of
mental abnormality and intoxication than for other types of evidence
now evaluated on a case-by-case basis; second, that the consequences of
failing to detect fakery are greater here than elsewhere.
Is there greater risk of counterfeited evidence here? One must first ask
how easy it is to feign the type of mental abnormality and intoxication
that will preclude the existence of a subjectively defined mental state. It
seems unlikely that a great number of defendants would be able to fake
such conditions convincingly. It has been observed that such pretense
would require two qualities that are rare among criminals: superior act-
ing ability and forethought.8 3 In addition, success would depend on
feigning the type or degree of impairment that would preclude the exist-
ence of subjective awareness; impairments that merely loosen inhibitions
would not qualify. Of course, there may in fact be some defendants who
have the necessary foresight and acting skills,8 4 and there may be forensic
experts who have a tendency to resolve doubts about the existence of
81. See Hall, supra note 5, at 1047; Armor., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236, 1245 (1966).
82. Lay testimony was at issue in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64 (D.C. 1976),
cert denied 433 U.S. 911 (1977), in which "lay witnesses testified that appellant's behav-
ior on that day appeared somewhat irrational." Id. at 68. Lay witnesses also testified for
the government. Id. at 69.
83. Simulation of intoxication to avoid responsibility for a crime presup-
poses. . . high intelligence, histrionic ability, and careful calculation. Even a
superficial survey of the cases shows that the inebriate offenders typify the very
opposite qualities-they are weak, impulsive, and frequently diseased. In light
of these various considerations, the persistently voiced fear of deception sug-
gests the presence of influences other than the reasons that are expressed.
Hall, supra note 5, at 1048; see G. Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part § 178, at
559-60 (2d ed. 1961); Paulsen, supra note 33, at 6.
84. Cf. "The Mind of a Murderer-Part II," Frontline #207 (March 26, 1984) (pub-
lic television documentary about the Bianca/Bono trial) (transcript available in files of
Fordham Law Review).
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debilitating conditions in favor of the defendant. s5 It would seem, how-
ever, to be at least as easy for a defendant to counterfeit alibi evidence, or
for either party purposely or accidentally to alter eyewitness testimony
by the manner of interviewing witnesses. s6 There is, however, no similar
blanket exclusion of alibi or eyewitness testimony. On the contrary, such
evidence is evaluated on a case-by-case basis, and by the jury, not the
court.
Does this difference mean that it is easier to detect counterfeit alibi or
eyewitness evidence than feigned evidence of mental abnormality or in-
toxication? An affirmative answer implies that the classic techniques of
thorough investigation, cross-examination and impeachment do not
work where evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication are con-
cerned. Yet it would seem that the standard litigator's tools would con-
tinue to be effective with regard to the evidence at issue here. There is no
reason why lay observations would be more difficult to discredit in this
realm than in any other."7 Further, defense experts always can be im-
peached with a critique of their methods or professional and forensic his-
tory.8 Standing against these observations is the argument that the jury
would be so overwhelmed by the emotional content of the defense evi-
85. "Some psychiatrists will continue to dig up excuses for criminal behavior...
even though some such 'excuses' may border on the ridiculous and be totally lacking in
scientific reliability. Unfortunately, some members of the judiciary will join them in ac-
cepting these excuses." Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 224, 360 A.2d 914, 921
(1976) (Eagen, J., dissenting).
86. See generally, E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 14-19, 175-77 (1979) (discussing
how the witness' "likeableness" and manner of speech, and the way attorney asks a ques-
tion can influence jury's perception of the evidence). One commentator has noted:
T]hat drunkenness can be readily feigned, may be disposed of at once. No
reason has been advanced why determination of this fact presents any greater
difficulty than do those raised by "mistake," "legal provocation," "insanity," or
many others; indeed, the contrary seems more probable when it is considered
that the history of the defendant and the events preceding his wrongful act are
examined in greater detail in the drunkenness cases than is usual.
Hall, supra note 5, at 1047-48.
87. If a lay witness is not credible for some reason, the jury can reject his testimony.
This is, in fact, a sacrosanct jury privilege, and judicial pre-screening of "reliability" in
this context poses the additional danger of invading the jury's prerogative to judge the
credibility of witnesses.
88. Bonnie and Slobogin suggest that where reliability of psychiatric evidence is a
concern, experts should be examined not so much about their "formal training and licens-
ing," but on "the witness's relevant experience and. . . on the adequacy of the witness's
evaluation procedure." Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 457. Such experts should
be required to have forensic experience, and to know the legal, as well as clinical, signifi-
cance of their observations. Id. at 457-61. These criteria, of course, presuppose a case-
by-case application. Id. at 466.
The imprecision of an expert's concepts, and the possible shortcomings of his
evaluative techniques, may be explored through direct examination and cross-
examination, and in arguments by counsel concerning the weight of his testi-
mony. The court can confine the expert to his sphere of specialized knowledge,
and exclude opinions on ultimate issues involving moral judgments. Cautionary
instructions also are available.
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dence that it would fail to pick up the danger signals produced by trad-
tional litigation techniques: The jurors would pity the defendant, or they
would identify with him. These feelings could make detection of fakery
more difficult. Of course, similar problems could exist when attractive
victims or eyewitnesses fabricate testimony. In any case, the issue is
closely related to that involving the prejudicial effect of true-but-affecting
evidence, to be considered next.
ii. Excluding Prejudicial Evidence
There is a danger that the jury would acquit because it felt particularly
sorry for the mentally abnormal person or identified closely with the in-
toxicated defendant. Equally worrisome is the possibility that the jury
would automatically adopt a defense expert's opinion. 9 Concerns such
as these could result in blanket exclusion of evidence if they led to the
conclusion that the probative value of the evidence always was out-
weighed by the risk of prejudice from the jury focusing on improper
factors. 90
The premise that juries always defer to experts can be questioned,91 as
can the notion that jurors will agree to the release of dangerous individu-
als because they feel sympathy or identification. In addition, jurors' emo-
tions of deference and sympathy can work both ways: The prosecution
undoubtedly will offer its own expert for the deferential juror's adulation,
89. See Expert Witness, supra note 49, at 590-93.
90. See Fed. R Evid. 403. "'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one." Fed. 1K Evid. 403 advisory committee note.
Concern about prejudicing the jury sometimes is expressed as a desire to exclude expert
testimony on an "ultimate issue" in the case. See, eg., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d
64, 89 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); State v. Lecompte, 371 So. 2d 239,
243 (La. 1979). Bonnie and Slobogin point out that the "ultimate issue" often has nor-
mative as well as empirical aspects (for example insanity or extreme emotional distur-
bance) and that expert witnesses should be precluded from expressing value judgments.
Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 456. However,
testimony regarding the nature and relative severity of a defendant's psycholog-
ical dysfunction, and informed estimates of what a defendant may have known,
perceived, or intended at a particular time, lie within the expertise of mental
health professionals. The factflnder, if alerted to the limitations of the expert's
knowledge and methodology, can profit from such testimony.
Id. at 456-57.
91. See, eg., James, Jurors' Evaluation of Expert Psychiatric Testimony, 21 Ohio St.
L.J. 75, 95 (1960) (reporting on 68 experimental jury resolutions of a case). One com-
mentator summarized James' findings as follows:
The defense presented two experts who had examined the defendant while the
state relied on lay testimony except for one expert who had never seen the ac-
cused before the trial. Of the sixty-eight juries, only 13% found the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity. 71% rejected the defendant's experts' testi-
mony and found him guilty. The other 16% could not reach a unanimous
verdict.
Invasion, supra note 80, at 668 n.132.
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and no doubt it will be able to muster a fair amount of sympathy for and
identification with the hapless victim.
iii. Avoiding the Presentation of Confusing Evidence
Courts also may exclude expert evidence on the subject of mental ab-
normality92 if they consider such evidence inherently confusing or mis-
leading.93 Blanket exclusion on such grounds is common for expert
evidence that is based on unproven scientific techniques. 94 The courts,
however, do not seem to question the techniques underlying the evidence
in the cases discussed here.95 On the contrary, courts that have excluded
evidence on the issue of mental state allow use of the same evidence for
other litigation purposes in which a jury might be equally confused.96
It is the use of the evidence to disprove mental state, not the evidence
itself, that some courts find inherently confusing; these courts think such
92. Experts on intoxication are not now widely used in criminal cases. Were they to
be used more frequently, it is likely that similar objections would be leveled at their
evidence.
93. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. It should be noted that if the evidence is indeed inherently
confusing, detecting counterfeiting or mistake, considered supra pt. II.B.2.a.i, will be
more difficult.
94. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), states the most common of
the court-adopted special rules for admissibility of scientific evidence. This rule makes
general acceptance by the relevant scientific community a condition to admissibility. See
id. at 1014. Among the attributes favorably cited for this test is the fact that "an appel-
late decision accepting a scientific development would establish precedent binding in sub-
sequent trials, at least until the scientific community changed its position." McCormick,
Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 879, 883
(1982) (discussing a test applied in People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30, 549 P.2d 1240,
1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976)) (footnote omitted). Even here, however, some
commentators "questioned the necessity for any special rule governing the admissibility
of scientific evidence. They believed the legitimate concerns of the Frye proponents could
be met adequately through careful application of traditional relevancy and expert testi-
mony rules." Id. at 885 (footnote omitted). In fact, the traditional analysis has been
increasingly preferred by courts. Id. at 886.
95. There is some support for the proposition that courts should re-evaluate whether
psychiatric evidence is sufficiently reliable for use in trials at all. See Expert Witness,
supra note 49, at 562-89. Because expert witnesses have been little used with regard to
evidence of intoxication, it is likely that their evidence would have to pass each jurisdic-
tion's test for the admission of "novel" scientific evidence.
96. In Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976), the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the trial court had excluded evi-
dence of mental abnormality that negatived the specific intent requirement of murder. It
noted the many other "areas in criminal law where we have accepted a psychiatrist's
opinion[:] on the issue of whether an accused is competent to stand trial[;J whether an
accused was insane at the time of the crime[;] whether an accused acted in the heat of
passion[;] whether an accused subjectively believed he was in imminent danger of death
or serious bodily injury under his claim of self-defense; whether an accused was capable
of making a detailed written confession; [and] at the penalty stage of trial." Id. at 219-20,
360 A.2d at 918-919 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250,
1257-8 (7th Cir.), cerL dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251,
1254 (R.I. 1981). It should be noted that the Walzack approach leaves the trial court the
opportunity to exclude pyschiatric testimony in a specific case.
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usage requires the jury to make unduly subtle distinctions.9" In Steele v.
State98 the court noted that exclusion of psychiatric testimony on the
issue of mens rea is " 'a pragmatic recognition of the limits of jury toler-
ance for distinguishing angels on the heads of pins,' "" and that the
" '[j]udge and jury ought not [to] be required to identify, classify and
evaluate all categories and classifications of human behavior beyond the
establishing of the fact of sanity.' " Another state supreme court be-
lieves that "psychiatric evaluation as to subtle gradations of mental im-
pairment is highly subjective and not within the common experience of
the layman juror."' 0 ' In other words, the evidence might be sufficiently
reliable for the jury to make gross assessments such as "sanity" or "in-
sanity," but it is not reliable enough to use in determining whether some-
one had a conscious awareness of the external situation in which he was
acting. 10
2
Courts expressing these views are saying, then, that the speculative
and imprecise nature of psychiatric evidence makes it admissible on the
issue of the insanity defense but not on the issue of mental state. This is
curious in that some commentators derive the opposite conclusion from
the same criticism: They would admit the evidence on mental state but
do away with the insanity defense.'03 In addition, evidence of intoxica-
tion can be quite speculative and imprecise, yet such evidence is used
relatively widely by both defense and prosecution."'4 Thus, the exclusion
97. See Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 96-97, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13 (1980) (application of
the insanity defense is basically a moral determination that "requires no fine tuning. It is,
rather, a gross evaluation that a person's conduct and mental state is so beyond the limits
of accepted norms that to hold him criminally responsible would be unjust. This is a far
cry from accepting testimony which purports to prove or disprove a specific intent
. . . .").
98. 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
99. Id. at 89, 294 N.W.2d at 9 (quoting Note, Criminal Law-First Degree Murder-
Evidence of Diminished Capacity Inadmissible to Show Lack of Intent, 1976 Wis. L. Rev.
623, 639).
100. Id. (quoting Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 485, 162 N.W.2d 77, 83 (1968), cert
denied, 394 U.S. 1004 (1969)).
101. State v. McKenzie, 177 Mont. 280, 330, 581 P.2d 1205, 1233 (1978), vacated, 443
U.S. 903 (1979).
102. See Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 87-88 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977).
103. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 434 & n. 15.
104. See id. at 435-41. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has rejected the
argument that evidence of mental abnormality should be admitted on the same basis as is
evidence of intoxication. Intoxication, the court claims, is susceptible to some degree of
"quantification or objective demonstration, and to lay understanding." It is part of
human experience that factfinders can understand and apply, in contrast to esoteric pys-
chiatric evidence. Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d at 88. Bonnie and Slobogin, how-
ever, point out that "[r]econstructive inquiries regarding the degree of a person's
intoxication due to alcohol ... and the nature of any associated functional or behavioral
impairment, are notoriously speculative and imprecise." Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note
13, at 435-36. It may be the case that because more people drink or take drugs than are
judged "insane," people have the illusion of being more familiar with intoxication. In
addition, purported unfamiliarity with mental abnormality will not necessarily stop ju-
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of evidence of mental abnormality on grounds of confusion seems illogi-
cal. Beyond that, however, the position reflects a profound mistrust of
juries. It fails to consider either their ability to make factually complex
decisions on other issues,105 or their potential resistance to expert-based
defenses in criminal cases. 0 6 Finally, the position ignores the possibility
of a case-by-case exclusion of evidence where, in the context of a particu-
lar lawsuit, the chances of confusion do exceed the possibilities of gui-
dance through careful cross-examination, jury instructions, and oral
argument.
iv. Implications of the Case-by-Case Analysis of Reliability
The discussion thus far has concerned the question whether the risk
that evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication is unreliable is so
great that such evidence always must be excluded on the issue of mental
state. Westen suggests that rules about reliability raise such "serious
constitutional problems" ' 7 that evidence should be excluded only when
it "is so inherently unreliable that it cannot rationally be evaluated."'0 8
Clinton, however, suggests that the Constitution might compel even the
introduction of "evidence with no extrinsic indicia of reliability . . . if
the evidence is of critical importance to the accused." 0 9 While Clinton's
position might be accurate in theory, it is unlikely that a court will afford
such extreme deference to defense evidence that is so strongly sur-
rounded with as many bugaboos as is the evidence under discussion.
Both authors agree, however, that the defense evidence must be evalu-
ated and balanced against the state's interests on a case-by-case basis and
that the least drastic alternative that will ensure reliability must be
used.110 The discussion thus far has revealed few, if any, persuasive rea-
sons why a case-by-case analysis cannot ensure sufficiently reliable
factfinding. In a particular situation, reliability may demand total exclu-
sion of the evidence. But there may be a number of occasions in which
rors from evaluating a case on the basis of what they think they know about the topic.
"The categories and theories of laypersons about mental dysfunction and human behav-
ior may draw heavily on 'common sense,' but they are also informed by superstition, fear,
and popular wisdom." Id. at 492. Testimony of experts could go far in clearing up lay
misunderstandings that will, absent the testimony, nevertheless inform the decision about
the defendant's guilt or innocence. See id. at 461-95.
105. State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251 (R.I. 1981), suggests that "judicial skepticism
. . . regarding psychiatric science is best resolved through the factfinder's determining
the credibility and weight to be given the expert's testimony instead of resolving the un-
certainty by a total exclusion ... , [which] implies a distrust of the jury." Id. at 1254.
106. "Even if the defense has offered the only psychiatric testimony, the natural skepti-
cism of the jurors, coupled with [cross-examination, closing arguments, and cautionary
instructions], should virtually eliminate the danger of the jury abdicating its factfinding
role." Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 466.
107. Westen, supra note 43, at 150.
108. Id. at 157.
109. Clinton, supra note 41, at 808-09 (discussing hearsay evidence) (footnote
omitted).
110. Id. at 800, 809-10; Westen, supra note 43, at 156-57.
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reliability can be equally well assured by effective cross-examination, jury
instructions and oral argument. In the latter situation, in fact, reliability
would be lessened by exclusion, because the jury would not hear proba-
tive, relevant evidence on a major issue in the case.III
These observations bring the discussion to the second premise underly-
ing the blanket exclusion of evidence of mental abnormality or intoxica-
tion: the assumption that the consequences of unreliable testimony are
greater here than in other areas." 2 The consequences, of course, are that
a person who truly had subjective awareness is acquitted altogether or is
convicted of a less serious crime requiring only objective fault. The con-
sequences are the same when any type of unreliable evidence is intro-
duced. For example, failure to detect chicanery could be regarded as
more serious only if vastly more defendants successfully feigned mental
abnormality or intoxication, or if the persons who were successful were
for some reason more dangerous than those successfully feigning other
defenses. This reasoning reveals that the focus here is not so much on
the reliability of factfinding per se, but on the incapacitation of dangerous
individuals resulting from reliable factfinding. The articulated concern
about reliability masks a deeper concern about dangerous people being
free to commit further crimes, a concern that will be examined in the
final section of this Article. 13
b. Efficiency
States have an interest in avoiding the inefficient use of judicial and
community resources, and thus in precluding the use of unduly time-
consuming evidence." 4 Defense evidence that negatives mental state has
been excluded under this rationale. For example, in refusing to allow
expert evidence of mental abnormality to be introduced on the issue of
mental state, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that "[t]he real danger
in permitting psychiatric evidence of mental or emotional disorders short
of insanity to negate intent is [in part] to . . .clutter practically every
trial with some sort of expert opinion evidence as to whether the defend-
ant possessed the requisite intent to commit the crime charged. '"'
The admission of negativing evidence, however, need not lead to a field
day for experts. Before the expert could testify on mental state, the de-
fense would have to show that the evidence was logically relevant to the
existence of the required mens rea. As noted above, the number of de-
S11. Where defense evidence on mental state is excluded, the jury's skepticism of a
defendant's claim that he did not have a normal person's awareness will prevent it from
adequately scrutinizing the prosecution's evidence. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note
13, at 477. "For this reason, we believe the only limitations on admissibility of mens rea
testimony by mental health professionals should be relevance and the normal require-
ments for expert opinion." Id.
112. See supra pt. I.B.2.a.i.
113. See infra pt. II.C.3.
114. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 & advisory committee note.
115. State v. Lecompte, 371 So.2d 239, 245 (La. 1978).
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fendants afflicted with qualifying psychological disorders or intoxication
presumably would be small,'1 6 and so the number of cases in which de-
fense experts would force the issue into litigation would be minimal.
Moreover, when proposed evidence in a particular case was unnecessa-
rily lengthy or cumulative, the court could exercise its power to make the
evidence more manageable.' 
1 7
The problem of inefficiency may appear to be more acute in the con-
text of a bifurcated trial in which the extrinsic defense of insanity is
raised only after the elements of the crime have been found by the jury.
If psychiatric evidence on the issue of mental state were also relevant to
an insanity defense, the jury might have to hear the same evidence twice.
The California Supreme Court recognized this problem, but suggested
that its solution lay in changing the nature of bifurcated trials or in abol-
ishing them completely." 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however,
concluded that the duplication problem should be avoided by the exclu-
sion of the negativing evidence in the first stage of the bifurcated trial;'"9
in other words, the state's interest in a "practical and convenient method
of disposing of the whole case"' 0 outweighs the defendant's interest in
introducing negativing evidence.
On the other hand, an argument may be made that if the state must
choose between allowing a negativing defense and an extrinsic defense,
the extrinsic defense must be jettisoned: Under Patterson, the state is not
compelled to permit the extrinsic defense at all. This argument would
force the conclusion that Wisconsin had to allow the psychiatric evidence
in the first stage of the trial and preclude it in the second. It is questiona-
ble, however, whether Wisconsin would have to make such a choice in
the first place. The court perceived that defense experts would have to
appear twice to give identical testimony if both defenses were allowed. ' 2 '
Yet even if there were some duplication in evidence, total exclusion of
the evidence in the first stage of the trial is not the least drastic solution
to the problem of redundancy. In the first stage, the defendant could
fully examine the expert, as he would in a nonbifurcated trial, and in the
second stage the jury could hear or read a transcript, or view a videotape.
The effect of a bifurcated trial also could be achieved through the use of a
single proceeding with special interrogatories. 22
116. See supra notes 28-29, 32-33 and accompanying text.
117. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.
118. People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 330-31, 583 P.2d 1308, 1316-17, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 265, 273-74 (1978).
119. Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 85-86, 294 N.W.2d 2, 8 (1980).
120. Id. at 86, 294 N.W.2d at 8 (quoting Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 78, 14 N.W. 912,
916 (1883)).
121. Id. at 90-91, 294 N.W.2d at 10-11.
122. "Special interrogatories" are a mechanism whereby a jury is to answer speciflc
factual questions in conjunction with a general verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty."
Special interrogatories normally are disfavored in criminal cases. Courts fear that spe-
cial interrogatories might " 'catechize' a reluctant juror away from an acquittal towards a
seemingly more 'logical' conviction." Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d 1241, 1245 (1st Cir.
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In sum, blanket exclusion of defense evidence is not the least intrusive
method of ensuring efficiency in criminal trials. When the threat to effi-
ciency is real, courts possess methods of saving time on a case-by-case
basis.
3. Reliability and Efficiency in the Balance
As concluded above, 2 3 it probably is valid to label as "compelling"
the state's interest in reliable and efficient factfinding, but a word of cau-
tion is in order about including efficiency in that description. The discus-
sion thus far has presupposed case-by-case determinations of whether
evidence is, in fact, negativing, whether proper techniques were ade-
quately followed in developing the evidence, and so forth. This case-by-
case evaluation is, in itself, a time-consuming and inefficient process. By
contrast, virtually no time is expended under an across-the-board exclu-
sionary rule, because few defendants would offer the evidence and courts
could, without hearing an offer of proof, reject whatever was offered. It
therefore should be recalled that efficiency per se is not the goal of the
criminal justice system. If it were, we would use an administrative rather
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975). That is, the jurors might ignore their traditional
right to acquit against the facts or law. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st
Cir. 1969). There is, however, no strict constitutional rule against use of special interrog-
atories, and they commonly are accepted for some limited purposes, as where determina-
tion of a particular fact (such as the value of stolen property) is crucial to sentencing the
defendant. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182 n.41; see Jalbert v. United States, 375 F.2d 125, 126
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967); 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 512, at 8-9 (2d ed. 1982). It should also be noted that, even in the context of the
insanity defense, bifurcated trials also have been justified for their aid in "separating the
guilt and disposition portions of criminal proceedings." Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 87
n.5, 294 N.W.2d 2, 8 n.5 (1980).
When sentencing is not directly the issue, special interrogatories nevertheless may be
acceptable. In the Spock case, the First Circuit disfavored "a progression of questions
each of which seems to require an answer unfavorable to the defendant." 416 F.2d at
182. In contrast, however, "certain questions may plainly lack any capacity to catechize,
color or coerce the jury's decision making." Heald v. Mullaney, 505 F.2d at 1246 (foot-
note omitted). The Heald court approved two questions worded in terms of whether the
defendant was acquitted because he was constructively, not actually, present at the crime,
and whether the acquittal was based on the state's failure to prove the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1243-44. Special interrogatories similarly could
be fashioned asking whether the defendant was acquitted because the state failed to prove
the required mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether the acquittal was be-
cause, while the defendant had formed the required mental state, he was insane. In this
context, it may be true that "because of the exigencies of the particular case, the special
findings [have] the purpose of benefiting the defendant," Spock, 416 F.2d at 182, who
otherwise might have to forego one or another defense under the rule followed in Steele.
The above arguments assume that the defendant has no right to a pure general verdict
in the situation in which he wants to assert mental abnormality as both a negativing and
an extrinsic defense. If the defendant does, in fact, have a right to an unfettered general
verdict, he presumably would be free to waive that right and allow special interrogatories
if the waiver were properly advised. See Spock, 416 F.2d at 182-83. It might be proper,
under these circumstances, for the state to demand that the defendant accept special
interrogatories or else choose one or the other of his defenses.
123. See supra pt. II.B.1.
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than an adjudicative method of resolving criminal charges.' 24 The state,
it would seem, has a compelling interest in avoiding only undue waste of
time, as would be the case if marginally probative evidence on a collateral
matter were admissible. 12
5
In addition, while an across-the-board exclusion of the evidence might
result in more "efficient" trials, such an exclusion would detract from the
state's interest in reliable trials. There may be instances in which time-
consuming evidence reliably would show that the defendant lacked the
required mental state. Because, presumably, a verdict based on incom-
plete defense evidence would be as unreliable as a verdict based on in-
complete prosecutorial evidence, this approach can be said to work
against, rather than for, the state's interest in reliable trials. If the inter-
est in efficiency is deemed "compelling," therefore, it is important to be
sure that this is not translated into a mandate for efficiency at all costs.
The state must be forced to use means less intrusive than blanket exclu-
sion of defense evidence, even if this permits some inefficiency to creep in
around the edges.
In sum, then, while the state's interest in reliability and efficiency may
be deemed "compelling," there are less intrusive means than blanket ex-
clusion to ensure those ends effectively. The reliability and efficiency of
the evidence must be determined on a case-by-case basis. While evidence
could be excluded after such individualized consideration, this solution
should be adopted only after adequate assessment of the value of cross-
examination, rebuttal evidence and cautionary jury instructions. 26
It might be protested that there are alternatives to both the exclusion
of evidence and cautionary instructions. For instance, it could be argued
that placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant would increase
the probability that only reliable evidence would be the basis of a verdict
of acquittal. There are, however, some problems with this alternative.
Chief among them is that the Supreme Court has precluded it. The Pat-
terson Court, recognizing that an interest in reliability might cause a state
to put the burden of persuasion on the defendant, condoned that practice
for extrinsic defenses. 127 In contrast to this was the Court's treatment of
defenses that negatived the existence of the elements that the state had
chosen, after all, to include in the definition of the offense.' 2 1 Earlier, in
Mullaney v. Wilbur,129 the Court held that there were no interests that
would allow a shift of the burden of persuasion for such defenses. 30
124. H. Packer, supra note 58, at 158-63.
125. An example of such evidence is hearsay testimony on a witness' reputation for
truth and veracity.
126. See Clinton, supra note 41, at 814-15 (discussing polygraph evidence); Westen,
supra note 43, at 133-39 (discussing competence of witnesses).
127. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
128. Id. at 207-09.
129. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
130. Id. at 701-02. Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976) (dismissed for lack of
substantial federal question), does not stand for the proposition that the state sometimes
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Assuming that this shift were constitutional, however, it still would be
undesirable in other respects. There is no real proof that putting the
burden of persuasion on the defendant increases the reliability of the ver-
dict. 3 ' Even if it does, shifting the burden of persuasion would not ad-
dress the other state interests. Efficiency, for example, would not be
increased, as the jury would hear the evidence as completely in any case.
In addition, such a shift would not necessarily satisfy the state's interest
in incapacitating dangerous individuals, 32 as a defendant might meet his
burden and, though dangerous, be freed. The fact that the restriction
would at best support only one of the state's interests makes it an unat-
tractive option.
At bottom, then, assuming that the state's interest in reliability and
efficiency is compelling, the state will have to serve that interest through
a case-by-case assessment of the problems presented and by using the
least restrictive alternative capable of solving the problems in each case.
It might, of course, be questioned whether, after Patterson, a state's inter-
est in reliability and efficiency can support even such a case-by-case ex-
clusion. The answer is that the states must be free to assert such rules if
they are to avoid being flooded with pointless evidence, and if the nation
as a whole is to avoid the constitutionalization of the law of evidence in
the criminal context. On the other hand, it would be reasonable to as-
sume that Patterson should be read as mandating increased deference to
the defendant's negativing evidence; at the appellate level, errors in ex-
cluding negativing evidence should never be deemed harmless.' 33
Finally, it may be observed that reliability and efficiency are traditional
can shift the burden of persuasion on mental state. This is because it is not clear that the
insanity defense at issue was being used in a negativing or an extrinsic manner. See Ri-
vera v. State, 351 A.2d 561, 563 (Del.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). Further-
more, it is apparent that in recent cases the Supreme Court has viewed insanity as a
totally extrinsic defense. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705-06 (1975) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring); compare Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798-99 (1952) (requiring
defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate basic standards of
justice) with Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487-88 (1895) (prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not insane).
131. "Burdens of proof do not enhance the rationality of the decision-making process.
Rather, they simply allocate the risk of errors to one party or the other." Allen, supra
note 27, at 45 n.60; see also id. at 47 n.65 (without knowing how many factually innocent
people would be convicted under "preponderance of evidence" standard, cannot ascertain
how much more reliable the "reasonable doubt" standard is).
132. See infra pt. II.C.
133. Cf E. Cleary, McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence 533 (3d ed. 1984)
("American courts quite early rejected the proposition that any trial error would require
the granting of a new trial, thus giving rise to the doctrine of 'harmless error' which
identifies those errors not requiring such relief. The rationale for regarding some errors
as harmless, of course, rests largely upon considerations of economy and judicial effi-
ciency. If it is sufficiently clear that another trial conducted without committing a partic-
ular error would lead to the same result, using judicial resources to conduct that retrial is
obviously inefficient." (footnotes omitted)).
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criteria of "legal relevance." 134 Courts express their concerns about neg-
ativing evidence of mental abnormality and intoxication in terms of these
legal-relevance criteria, and then they apply the criteria in illogical and
inadequate ways. Evidence that is reliable enough to be used in other
contexts is excluded when offered to negative mental state. Proof is pre-
cluded on grounds of "inefficiency" when efficient ways exist to hear cru-
cial and reliable evidence. In fact, the inconsistencies between the
treatment of expert testimony in this and other contexts would seem to
imply that the concerns worded in terms of the traditional legal-rele-
vance criteria really mask deeper and different anxieties-that is, anxie-
ties about incapacitating dangerous people. 135  Allowing courts to
sidestep these real issues through the "legal relevance" approach does a
disservice not only to individual defendants, but also to the criminal jus-
tice system as a whole.
C. The State's Interest in Incapacitating Dangerous Individuals
The discussion thus far has explored the state's interest in controlling
the trial process for its own sake. While reliability and efficiency can be
assured by measures less drastic than blanket exclusion of negativing evi-
dence, total exclusion of evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication
nevertheless has been mandated frequently. 136 This practice can be ex-
plained by a third concern that undoubtedly underlies attempts to justify
generic exclusion: the fear of releasing back into society acquitted de-
fendants who continue to be dangerous.' 37 The incapacitation rationale
134. Some courts and textwriters have described this process of weighing
marginal costs and benefits as a matter of "legal relevancy," in that "legally
relevant" evidence must have a "plus value" beyond a bare minimum of proba-
tive value. This notion of "plus value" is at best an imprecise way to say that
the probative value and the need for the evidence must outweigh the harm
likely to result from admission, and most modem opinions do not rely on such
potentially misleading terminology.
Id. at 548 (footnotes omitted).
135. Bonnie and Slobogin see the attack on defense experts as part of a challenge to the
increased subjectivism of criminal mental state requirements. Bonnie & Slobogin, supra
note 13, at 428-29, 431-32. It is, of course, harder to convict and incapacitate when
subjective fault must be proved.
136. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
137. One court expressed this concern quite candidly:
[Tihe overriding danger of [allowing psychiatric evidence on the issue of mental
state] is that it would discard the traditional presumptions concerning mens rea
without providing for a corresponding adjustment in the means whereby society
is enabled to protect itself from those who cannot or will not conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law.
Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 90 (D.C. 1976) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977). The court contrasted this with the insanity defense, which "avoids a
conviction, but confronts the accused with the very real possibility of prolonged thera-
peutic confinement." Id. (footnotes omitted). Goldstein suggests that in order to deal
with dangerous mentally abnormal individuals society must find ways either to restrict
psychiatric evidence to the insanity defense or to detain or supervise those acquitted be-
cause of negativing defenses. A. Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 206-07 (1967).
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becomes especially focal with regard to alcoholism and other
addictions.1 38
The logic behind the incapacitation concern goes something like this:
The state has an obvious interest in incapacitating individuals who have
caused harm to others and might do so again if released. The easiest way
of protecting society is to exclude the evidence altogether so that the
defendant will be found guilty and incarcerated. 39 In the case of mental
138. One might see a desire to incapacitate dangerous individuals as the rationale be-
hind the Model Penal Code's adoption of the special rule precluding evidence of intoxica-
tion to negative recklessness. Model Penal Code § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The drafters acknowledge that an intoxicated offender lacking awareness of risk could be
found to have committed the offense of being "drunk and dangerous," Model Penal Code
§ 2.08 comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 9 1959), but such convictions apparently are not as
satisfactory as conviction for the crime reflecting the type of damage done by the unaware
intoxicated person. The drafters adopted this position mainly because they perceived a
moral equivalence between becoming very drunk and committing the proscribed harm:
[A]wareness of the potential consequences of excessive drinking on the capacity
of human beings to gauge the risks incident to their conduct is by now so dis-
persed in our culture that we believe it fair to postulate a general equivalence
between the risks created by the conduct of the drunken actor and the risks
created by his conduct in becoming drunk . . . . The actor's moral culpability
lies in [becoming so drunk as to destroy temporarily the actor's powers of per-
ception and of judgment].
Id. at 9. To put this observation differently, a person who knowingly engages in the risky
conduct of drinking large amounts of alcohol is dangerous and should be locked up for as
long as the law or legal fiction will allow.
One can question the premise behind the special rule for intoxication. It arguably is
inapplicable to sufferers of the disease of alcoholism, who, while the disease is active,
cannot control the amount of alcohol they ingest. See infra notes 162-67 and accompany-
ing text. Nonalcoholics who become drunk in order to be able to do something risky or
unpleasant are, by definition, outside the scope of concern, as their subjective mental state
with regard to that activity will have been formed prior to the drunken state. While it
may be well understood that alcohol can decrease inhibitions, uninhibited actors are also
outside the scope of concern, as they possess the subjective awareness required for convic-
tion. The problem is limited to the situation in which intoxication produces lack of
awareness. One can question the extent to which the general public is aware either of
alcohol's ability to have this effect or of the circumstances, including the amount of alco-
hol, under which the dynamic operates.
Assuming, however, that this "moral" culpability can be postulated, one still can ques-
tion whether the solution should be the conviction, for a crime requiring awareness of
risk, of a person who lacked such awareness. It is noteworthy that the drafters of the
Model Penal Code restrict their special rule to intoxicated offenders. A mentally abnor-
mal individual, for example, who knows he must take medication to control dangerous
delusions, is equally morally culpable when he fails to take that medication and commits
serious harm. Yet his delusional state will qualify as a negativing defense; he will not be
convicted for a crime requiring the subjective awareness that he lacked. Model Penal
Code § 4.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). One can only assume that, under the Model
Penal Code scheme, this mentally abnormal person either will be acquitted totally, or will
be convicted of a crime with mental state requirements that accurately reflect reality. In
either case one can also presume that the sentencing judge or civil commitment authori-
ties will make sure that the offender receives treatment sufficient to reinstate the use of
medication or that whatever steps are necessary to ensure public safety will be taken.
139. It should be noted that restricting the admissibility of "negativing" evidence to
"specific intent" elements may have the same effect as restricting it altogether, in that the
defendant might be convicted of a lesser included offense and be incapacitated for at least
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abnormality, the evidence can be channeled into the insanity defense
causing the defendant to be incapacitated in a "therapeutic" facility.' 40
The following discussion will assume, for the time being, that the
state's interest in incapacitating dangerous individuals is compelling.
Nevertheless, incapacitation often can be achieved by means less intru-
sive than the exclusion of reliable negativing evidence. These alternative
means will be explored below. As will be seen, however, they work im-
perfectly. In fact, even the most extreme efforts cannot close the gaps.
Such efforts are called for, however, only if the state's interest is "com-
pelling," a characterization that will be examined at the end of this
Article.
1. Meeting the Need for Safety
The state has two ways to maximize the incapacitation of dangerous
individuals without doing violence to a defendant's right to introduce
logically relevant evidence. First, it can find other ways to incapacitate
dangerous defendants who would be acquitted. Alternatively, it can
redefine existing crimes, or create new crimes, such that mental abnor-
mality or intoxication would no longer be negativing defenses. These
options will be considered in turn.' 4 '
a. Civil Commitment of the Acquitted Defendant
Defendants who successfully use an extrinsic insanity defense usually
are committed to mental institutions until they are no longer a threat to
the community. 142 Even in jurisdictions where such a result is not auto-
a while. Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and the Diminished Responsibility Defenses:
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 827, 829 (1977). The only real
impact is on the length of incarceration. In fact, the existence of a lesser included crime
of which the defendant would be convicted may be a condition for some courts' accept-
ance of psychiatric evidence on the issue of "specific intent." See, e.g., Hughes v. Ma-
thews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir.) (court leaves open question whether exclusion of
psychiatric evidence would be proper when there is no lesser included crime), cert. dis-
missed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1254 (R.I. 1981) (in adopt-
ing a "diminished capacity" defense, court assumes that there would be such a lesser
included offense); see also Hall, supra note 5, at 1051-52 (discussing intoxication and
specific intent).
140. See, e.g., Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 91, 294 N.W.2d 2, 10 (1980) (quoting
State v. Hebard, 50 Wis. 2d 408, 418-19, 184 N.W.2d 156, 162 (1971)); A. Goldstein,
supra note 137, at 143-70. The punitive, nontherapeutic motivations underlying commit-
ment of insanity acquittees are traced by Morris, Acquittal by Reason of Insanity: Devel-
opments in the Law, in Mentally Disordered Offenders: Perspectives from Law and
Social Science 70-71 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
141. For a general discussion of considerations appropriate to legislative choice among
these alternatives, see Goldstein & Katz, supra note 54, at 870-76.
142. See Morris, supra note 140, at 70-71.
Some states view NGI [not guilty by reason of insanity] commitment as thera-
peutic in purpose and focus on the individual's mental condition. They require
that he or she be "restored to sanity," or "cured," or "no longer mentally ill,"
or "entirely and permanently recovered" in order to be eligible for release. Be-
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matic,1 43 the commitment proceeding that follows such an acquittal gen-
erally leads to supervision or outright institutionalization.'" Those
found not guilty by reason of insanity are treated more harshly and given
fewer post-commitment procedural protections than are persons civilly
committed without prior criminal acquittal.1 45 But even commentators
favoring an equalization of treatment for criminal acquittees agree that it
is reasonable to subject them to some type of commitment hearing and to
institutionalization until the threat to the community reasonably is
over. 146
There is no obvious reason why the mechanism of civil commitment
could not also be used to incapacitate those whose mental abnormality or
intoxication precluded the existence of the required mental state.'4 7
Most states have civil commitment procedures that easily could be modi-
fied, if necessary, to achieve this alternative. 41 For example, the trial
cause some mental illnesses, including schizophrenia, can last a lifetime, a re-
quirement that the patient's illness be cured can lead to lifelong confinement.
Other states view the NGI commitment as a form of preventive detention and
focus on the dangerousness of the individual. They require that he or she no
longer be dangerous in order to be eligible for release.
Id.
143. In some jurisdictions, persons found not guilty by reason of insanity are automati-
cally committed. Id. at 67-68. There are, however, good arguments against automatic
commitment for people found not guilty by reason of insanity. See id. at 68-70 (acquittal
by reason of insanity never need establish whether defendant in fact committed criminal
act, allowing defendant to be committed although innocent; defendant automatically
committed because "dangerous" although charged with nonviolent crime); id. at 80-86
(committing act insufficient for presumption of dangerousness which might justify auto-
matic commitment; trial finding that defendant was insane at time of act not a finding
that defendant still insane for commitment purposes). These arguments would also apply
to people acquitted for lack of mental state.
144. Even where commitment is not automatic after a finding of NGI, "indeterminate
commitment [is often] easily achievable under a variety of procedures and standards."
Id. at 68. These include a virtual presumption of committability. Id. at 88-90.
145. Id. at 67-80.
146. See generally id. at 80-108 (discussing optional methods of commitment, having
rejected mandatory, indeterminate commitment).
147. Jurisdictions that treat NGI acquittees more harshly than people civilly commit-
ted without prior criminal acquittal, see id., might be similarly harsh to people criminally
acquitted because mental abnormality or intoxication precluded proof of mental state;
after all, in both instances the defendant probably committed an act that would have been
criminal. See id. at 107. This author agrees with Morris that criminal acquittees who are
committable ought to be treated similarly to ordinary civil commitment subjects. Id. at
84-85. People who are civilly committed often can be dangerous. In a sense, the main
difference between civil committees and criminal acquittees is that the former were inter-
cepted before their potential for dangerousness reached fruition.
The suggestion that criminal acquittees be treated similarly to civil committees, how-
ever, is not intended as a blanket endorsement of civil commitment, a process which is
plagued with numerous problems of its own. See id. at 97-98 & n.165. Even so, civil
commitment may be a less intrusive alternative than inappropriate criminal conviction.
148. The court in Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 92 (D.C. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 911 (1977), rejected the alternative of civil commitment because of "significant
procedural differences." The court did not, however, rigorously examine whether there
were ways to address this disparity.
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judge could be given authority to initiate civil commitment proceedings
for the acquitted criminal defendant, with the attendant pre-hearing cus-
tody so that no release would occur in the interim. 14 9 The transcripts of
the relevant portions of the criminal trial proceedings could be deemed
admissible and, if advisable, the same experts could be appointed examin-
ers in the civil proceeding.150 Persons could be committable if, because
of mental disease or defect, they posed a significant threat to the property
as well as the person of others.
151
There are, of course, certain problems involved in civilly committing
persons acquitted on the basis of a negativing mental-state defense. For
one thing, the jury may have had a reasonable doubt about the existence
of the required mental state; 152 that fact may not mean that the state is
able to meet the requirements for civil commitment. 153 Of course, the
state's requirements can be eased, for example by lowering the standard
of proof. When a criminal defendant is acquitted on the basis of evidence
of mental abnormality, such acquittal could be made a rebuttable pre-
sumption of present mental illness and dangerousness. These solutions,
however, carry obvious threats to the civil liberties of those undergoing
commitment proceedings. In any event, some acquitted persons might
nevertheless avoid being committed.
Another problem with the civil commitment approach is that most
states allow civilly committed persons to be released at the discretion of
hospital officials without court review.' 54 The public is likely to perceive
that, in making release decisions, doctors focus on the therapeutic needs
of a patient, not the safety of the community. 155 Such a perception
would reduce public trust in the ability of the civil commitment system
to protect society from those who are so dangerous that they are now
treated criminally. While the problem could be lessened by the creation
149. See, e.g., 1983 Or. Laws ch. 740, at 1412-13 (amending Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 426.070(5) (1981)); Morris, supra note 140, at 83, 87-88, 97-99.
150. This would, of course, be different from presuming that the criminal acquittee is
committable. See Morris, supra note 140, at 88-90.
151. See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.020(3), -.05.150 (Supp. 1984-85).
152. This might be the case when the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion on
mental state. When the defendant carries the burden of persuasion (for example, on in-
sanity, as he does in about half the states, Morris, supra note 140, at 68), a defense verdict
is an actual finding that the defendant was mentally abnormal at the time of the offense.
Id. at 82-83.
153. Compare this situation with the one where the verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity was an actual finding that the defendant was mentally abnormal at the time of
the offense, see supra note 152. Even there, however, there is no assurance that the de-
fendant will be found mentally ill at the time of the civil commitment hearing. Id. at 68-
69 & n.8, 90.
154. Id. at 72-74.
155. Therapists are likely to be more cautious about releasing civilly committed people
if there is an increase in lawsuits against doctors who fail to confine dangerous patients.
Cf. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 437-39, 551 P.2d 334, 344-46,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-26 (1976). It should be noted, however, that under California law
the defendant therapists in Tarasoff were not open to liability for releasing their patient,
but for failing to warn a known potential victim.
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of a release/supervision system similar to Oregon's Psychiatric Security
Review Board, 56 this would, of course, entail additional changes in state
laws and administrative organization.1 57
The civil commitment route also poses problems in dealing with those
whose acquittal for lack of mental state was based on intoxication. Un-
less the intoxication had been long-term, resulting in permanent brain
damage, it is unlikely that such an acquittee could be civilly committed
under existing statutes which require the predicate of "mental disease or
defect." On the other hand, it is not beyond society's ability to create
civil commitment procedures for alcoholics or alcohol abusers."5 8 The
State of Washington has done just that.15 9 Its approach, however, would
156. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 161.319-.351 (1981) (amended by 1983 Or. Laws chs. 430,
800, at 818-19, 1541-44). In Oregon, some defendants found "guilty except for insanity"
(formerly "not guilty by reason of insanity") are, after additional findings, placed under
the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) for a period equal to
the maximum sentence that would have been available upon conviction. If the acquittee,
immediately or after institutional treatment, is "conditionally released" into society, the
PSRB directs and reviews the supervision of that individual on release. The PSRB can
set the release conditions, and it receives monthly reports from the direct supervisors.
The PSRB can terminate conditional release by returning the individual to a treatment
institution or by discharging the individual altogether. Various procedural rights, includ-
ing hearings and appointment of counsel, accompany these provisions. Id. There is no
obvious reason why such a supervised release system could not be instituted for civil
commitment subjects who are, under appropriate criteria, considered dangerous.
157. An objection might be that increasing civil commitments would put pressure on
already overburdened mental health facilities and social service budgets. One might an-
swer that proportionally fewer people would be using prison facilities, leading to savings
in that area. In addition, treatment arguably is a better long run use of funds than is
incarceration, at least for those offenders whose conditions are treatable. While some
treated persons may nonetheless repeat criminal behavior, more incarcerated-but-un-
treated addicts and mentally ill people are likely to do so. Thus, while it must be ac-
knowledged that the proposed alternative will likely have economic consequences, this
alone should not defeat the proposal.
158. Regarding the difference between an alcoholic and an alcohol abuser, see infra
notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
159. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.96A (1975 & Supp. 1984-85). The Washington
scheme allows a person to be committed after investigation shows him to be incapacitated
as a result of alcoholism or shows him to be a threat to the safety of others. Id.
§ 70.96A.140(1) (Supp. 1984-85). This conclusion is warranted when "as a result of the
use of alcohol, [an individual] has his judgment so impaired that he is incapable of realiz-
ing and making a rational decision with respect to his need for treatment and constitutes
a danger to himself, to any other person, or to property." Id. § 70.96A.020(7) (emphasis
supplied). The petition must allege that the person is an "alcoholic," which means that
he or she "habitually lacks self-control as to the use of alcoholic beverages, or uses alco-
holic beverages to the extent that his health is substantially impaired or endangered or his
social or economic function is substantially disrupted." Id. § 70.96A.020(1). Commit-
ment shall not be ordered unless the court "determines that an approved treatment facil-
ity is able to provide adequate and appropriate treatment for [the alcoholic] and the
treatment is likely to be beneficial." Id. § 70.96A. 140(4) (Supp. 1984-85).
With regard to the ability of an individual to recognize his need for treatment, it should
be noted that "middle-" and "late-stage" alcoholics exhibit a symptom called "denial," in
which they are unable to acknowledge the existence of an alcohol problem, to understand
that the problem stems from disease, or to respond appropriately to the offer or experi-
ence of remedial programs. "Denial" may result in part from deterioration of mental
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have to be modified to deal with the incapacitation of persons acquitted
of crimes because intoxication precluded formation of the required
mental state. For one thing, such persons could have been "intoxicated"
on drugs other than alcohol. While it might be easy to add such persons
to the list of those amenable to commitment, alternative criteria would
have to be added to take into account the different signs diagnostic of
other types of drug addiction. In addition, the scheme presupposes the
existence of facilities to treat drug addiction and alcoholism adequately
and professionals knowledgeable and skillful enough to evaluate persons
subject to commitment. While it may be tempting to assume that current
mental health professionals and treatment facilities could do the job, ex-
perts in the fields of alcoholism and other drug addictions have cogent
evidence that these problems are physical, rather than mental, diseases"
and that treatment by mental health professionals frequently exacerbates
rather than cures the conditions. 161
There is, however, a more serious drawback to the use of civil commit-
ment to incapacitate those whose mental state was lacking because of
intoxication. It concerns the increasingly understood difference between
simple drug and alcohol abusers and those who are truly addicted to
such substances. It is common knowledge that there are recreational
drug users who avoid addiction. Similarly, there is a distinction between
a problem drinker and an "alcoholic." '162 The former is someone who,
because of emotional or social factors, occasionally drinks to excess; such
a person's body metabolizes alcohol in a normal manner. In keeping
with the modem view that alcoholism is a physical, rather than mental,
processes from toxic poisoning and physical impairment. See J. Milam & K. Ketcham,
Under the Influence 87-88, 97 (1981). Recent evidence shows that chronic ethanol abuse
can lead to neuronal damage, resulting in functional mental impairment and cerebral
atrophy, but that that impairment and atrophy can be reversed upon cessation of alcohol
ingestion. Carlen, Wortzman, Holgate, Wilkinson & Rankin, Reversible Cerebral Atro-
phy in Recently Abstinent Chronic Alcoholics Measured by Computed Tomography Scans,
200 Sci. 1076-78 (1978). This study is criticized and further discussed in Hill & Mikhael,
Computed Tomography Scans of Alcoholics: Cerebral Atrophy?, 204 Sci. 1237-38 (1979).
Certainly "denial" has social and psychological components as well. G. Vaillant, The
Natural History of Alcoholism: Causes, Patterns, and Paths to Recovery 172-73 (1983).
160. J. Milam & K. Ketcham, supra note 159, at 29-73.
161. The better view holds that alcoholism is exacerbated when mental health profes-
sionals attempt to teach true alcoholics how to "drink responsibly." This is so because
any amount of alcohol ingested into the body will further the progression of the disease.
Thus, total abstinence is the only alternative for the true alcoholic. Id. at 14, 124-52. In
order to treat an alcoholic patient effectively, medical doctors usually must acquire spe-
cial knowledge rarely taught at medical school. Id. at 116. Even after the American
Medical Association recognized in 1956 that alcoholism is a disease, most physicians
continued to view it as a psychological inadequacy; treating the disease in this manner
has been estimated to cut recovery rates by at least half. Id. at 129-31. Finally, many
physicians and psychiatrists treat the alcoholic patient with drugs that will produce the
effects of cross-addiction and cross-tolerance. Id. at 156-57, 160-61.
162. There may also be nonalcoholics who have biochemically abnormal reactions to
even small amounts of alcohol. Paulsen, supra note 33, at 16-17.
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disease, 63 an "alcoholic" is defined as one having an enzyme malfunc-
tion such that his body metabolizes alcohol to produce substances that
cause physical addiction. 1" Such a person begins drinking for the same
reasons as most drinkers in our society, and then becomes progressively
more physically dependent on the substance.1 65 At some point, he is un-
able to control when or how much to consume to avoid the physical
discomfort (some would say "pain") of lacking the substance. Alcoholics
can avoid the progressive worsening of their physical condition only by
totally and forever abstaining from alcohol; 166 alcohol abusers, presuma-
bly, could become responsible drinkers if they learned to control their use
of the drug. Diagnostic procedures exist to distinguish alcoholics from
problem drinkers.
167
The civil commitment scheme used by the State of Washington is
aimed at treating true alcoholics. While problem drinkers would benefit,
of course, from total abstinence, it may not be necessary to their func-
tioning as nondangerous human beings. Furthermore, they likely would
not meet the criteria for civil commitment. The same problem would
occur with a civil commitment scheme aimed at drug "addicts." Thus,
163. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. The modem view is that alcohol-
ism is a primary physical disease. Most alcoholics, like any diseased person, develop
secondary mental and social problems. See J. Milam & K. Ketcham, supra note 159, at
31-32, 88.
164. Id. at 32-34. A recent work, by a doctor resistant to acknowledging the physical
basis of alcoholism, discounts in passing the metabolic analysis, but does not deal directly
with the analysis or with the primary sources supporting it. See G. Vaillant, supra note
159, at 5. Dr. Vailant's own data, however, strongly support a hereditary and physical
explanation for predisposition to alcoholism. See id. at 102 (Table 2.18), 311. Dr. Vail-
lant makes no attempt to analyze how the genetic differences manifest themselves in the
body's reaction to alcohol. Cf. State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873, 875 (W.Va.
1982) (recognizing alcoholism as a disease).
165. 1 Milam & K. Ketcham, supra note 159, at 43-73.
166. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. See also the discussion of the "de-
nial" symptom in "middle-" and "late-stage" alcoholics, supra note 159.
167. There is no one factor that is diagnostic of alcoholism. "Alcoholism is a unitary
syndrome but one defined by the number, not by the specificity, of alcohol-related
problems." G. Vaillant, supra note 159, at 42. The factors indicative of alcoholism can
be generalized into four groupings:
First, the diagnosis should imply causative factors that are independent of the
presence or absence of social deviance. Alcohol addiction is often a necessary
and sufficient cause for such social deviance as is observed, and alcohol depen-
dence is significantly more likely when biologic relatives have also been alco-
holic .... Second, the diagnosis should convey shorthand information about
symptoms and course. ... [TIhe diagnosis of alcoholism predicts that a whole
constellation of symptoms are present. . .. [T]he diagnosis of alcoholism im-
plies a disorder that lasts for several years. Third, the diagnosis should be valid
cross-culturally and not dependent on mores or fashion... . Finally, the diag-
nosis should suggest appropriate medical response for treatment. Alcoholism,
to the extent that it involves physical dependence, often requires detoxification
in a medical setting, and... specific treatment is often required in order to
maintain sustained abstinence from alcohol.
Id. at 44. For examples of questions that should be asked in an attempt to diagnose
alcoholism, see id. at 295-98.
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mere alcohol and drug abusers who are not true addicts would slip
through the cracks: They would be acquitted of the criminal charges for
lack of mental state, and they would not be civilly committed for failure
to meet the criteria.
One answer might be to establish standards for committing and treat-
ing those who are not true addicts. While this might be possible, it is
unlikely that such treatment would differ vastly from the type of psycho-
logical counseling given to other slightly disturbed or immature people in
society. It is questionable whether such counseling requires or justifies
institutionalization. If it does not, the need for safety is, arguably, unmet
until the outpatient counseling is successful. On the other hand, there is
one justification for at least short-term institutionalization: to get the
abuser's attention. The fact that the abuser has caused results that would
have been criminal had he not lacked mental state might justify such an
attention-getting device. The theory is that the abuser should be institu-
tionalized just long enough to ensure that he took his problem seriously
and would continue with outpatient supervision and treatment.
The above discussion indicates that it is possible to alter and enlarge
the civil commitment system to provide incapacitation and treatment for
people whose mental abnormality or intoxication precludes conviction on
criminal charges. The question remains whether this method of incapac-
itation is really "less intrusive" than inappropriate criminal conviction.
Individually, the question is particularly acute with regard to persons
who are untreatable for one reason or another.1 68 Societally, the ques-
tion arises because expanding the government's civil commitment op-
tions may entail a threat to civil liberties.1 69 Discussion of these issues
will be enhanced by the consideration in the next section of the state's
other option for incapacitation.
b. Redefining Offenses
An alternative to expanding the civil commitment system is to redefine
offenses such that evidence of mental abnormality or intoxication can
never be negativing. This could be done by changing the definitions of
existing offenses or by creating new offenses.
i. Redefining Existing Offenses
The most obvious way to eliminate negativing evidence is to remove
168. Commitment becomes mere warehousing when there is no known "cure" for a
condition, or when the jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to make available the funds
necessary for adequate treatment. Conditions in the commitment institution may be less
attractive even than conditions in a penitentiary. Commitment also may be indetermi-
nate in length and difficult to end. Under these conditions, an individual might not find
commitment a less onerous alternative than inappropriate criminal conviction. As
Packer points out, "[tjhirty days in jail for disorderly conduct is much less unpleasant
than a lifetime in the locked ward of a state mental hospital." H. Packer, supra note 58,
at 25.
169. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
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from the definition of the crime any element potentially negatived by that
evidence. For example, mental abnormality or intoxication certainly
could not "negative" mental state if there were no mental state require-
ment in the offense. It has been suggested that mental state should be
eliminated as a requirement of culpability and considered only on the
issue of punishment.170 While the Supreme Court has indicated that
states constitutionally are limited in their power to reduce prosecutorial
burdens by tinkering with definitions,171 it has not actually held that
there is a constitutional requirement of a mental state element. 1 2
Nevertheless, it is a drastic solution to apply "strict liability"" 3 to all
crimes, and there are reasons why a jurisdiction would not want to do
so.174 It will be assumed for purposes of discussion that most jurisdic-
tions would want to retain a mens rea element in the definition of all true
crimes. Those same jurisdictions, however, might want to define the
170. See B. Wootton, Crime and the Criminal Law 65-86 (2d ed. 1981) (mental condi-
tion of defendant relevant not to determination of culpability, but to the choice of treat-
ment most likely to discourage him from offending again).
171. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
172. Allen argues that "Patterson, [if it is viewed as embracing the proportionality
concept,] provides the method to determine whether a state's definition of a crime is
constitutionally permissible." Allen, supra note 27, at 48. "Constitutional acceptance of a
requirement of culpability, however, is at best uncertain." Jeffries & Stephan, supra note
3, at 1374; cf. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CL. Rev. 107 (para-
phrasing the position of the Supreme Court as maintaining that "[miens rea is an impor-
tant requirement, but it is not a constitutional requirement, except sometimes").
173. The paradigm case of liability without fault is a penal statute that pun-
ishes conduct without reference to any state of mind indicative of blameworthi-
ness. For example, a law might condemn as criminal the sale of impure food
without requiring that the actor know of the impurity or even that he be aware
of facts giving reason to know. Liability with respect to the impurity would be
strict-that is, it would not depend on proof of any mental attitude with respect
to that element of the offense. Thus, the actor could be convicted even though
he believed his products to be pure and had done all that could have been done
to ensure purity.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1373; see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,
278, 284-85 (1943) (upholding conviction for introducing into commerce misbranded and
adulterated drugs, despite lack of any conscious wrongdoing).
174. [T]o punish conduct without reference to the actor's state of mind is
both inefficacious and unjust. It is inefficacious because conduct unaccompa-
nied by an awareness of the factors making it criminal does not mark the actor
as one who needs to be subjected to punishment in order to deter him or others
from behaving similarly in the future, nor does it single him out as a socially
dangerous individual who needs to be incapacitated or reformed. It is unjust
because the actor is subjected to the stigma of criminal conviction without being
morally blameworthy.
Packer, supra note 172, at 109; accord, Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1373-74. In
addition, "liability without fault [generally] is confined to so-called 'regulatory' or 'public
welfare' offenses," Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1373. Allowing conviction of
"true" crimes on a strict liability basis would be an extreme innovation, and presumably
would require motivations more profound than a desire to incarcerate a small number of
people who would otherwise be acquitted. This is because everyone could be convicted
on a strict liability basis, not just mentally abnormal or intoxicated persons. Thus, a great
premium would be placed on prosecutorial discretion in issuing charges and on judicial
discretion in sentencing.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53
mental state element in such a way that mental abnormality and intoxi-
cation would not negative its existence. Many jurisdictions with this goal
would first have to rationalize, clarify and define the mental state ele-
ments in their existing crimes. It has been observed that the traditional
approach of courts and legislatures to the mental state requirement in
crimes has produced "variety, disparity and confusion,"' 75 a lack of clar-
ity, and "obscurity." '1 76 This state of affairs is attributable in part to the
crazy-quilt proliferation of "mental state" words,'7 7 in part to the fact
that these words are frequently ill-defined, inconsistently defined, or not
defined at all,178 and in part to the fact that courts and legislatures often
fail to indicate which physical elements are to be considered in light of
which mental state requirement. 179 Imagine, for example, that a defend-
ant wants to introduce evidence that his intoxication precluded him from
forming the mental state of "wantonness." Unless the meaning of that
word is clear, a court will not know whether the evidence is negativing or
extrinsic. Before a state can preclude negativing defenses based on
mental abnormality or intoxication, it must have a clear understanding of
the nature of the existing mental state requirements.
While the challenge may exist for certain "special" mental states, such
as "wantonness,"' 0 it is particularly acute with regard to the mental
state labeled "general intent." 8' Defining "general intent" in some juris-
175. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
176. Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment at 124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
177. Words used to define mental state include, for example, "intent," "specific in-
tent," "general intent," "corruption," "malice," "scienter, .... wilfullness" and "wanton-
ness." See generally R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 831-80 (3d ed. 1982)
(discussing the meanings of the above terms); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1363 &
n. 113 (as of 1970, federal penal statutes used 78 different words and phrases to describe
mental states); id. at 1372 n. 131 (citing cases illustrating the different meanings attributed
to "wilfully").
178. In part, the lack of clarity in the definition of mental state words may derive from
the sub silentio evolutionary attachment of modem meanings to common law terms. See
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1363 & n.113, 1372 n.131; Sayre, MensRea, 45 Harv.
L. Rev. 974, 1017-19 (1932).
179. Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment at 124 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (draft at-
tempts to define the kind of culpability which will arise with respect to the elements of:
The nature of the forbidden conduct; the attendant circumstances; and the result of the
conduct, to dispel obscurity which has followed terms such as "mens rea" and "general
criminal intent").
180. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra note 177, at 879-80.
181. "General intent" has been viewed in two general ways, which are reviewed and
discussed in the following pages. Both interpretations, however, present some problems
in conjunction with the most restrictive reading of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
This reading requires the prosecution to prove only elements overtly in the definition of
the offense. See supra note 27. It is often the nature of general intent that no mental state
words appear in the definition of the crime, but are assumed to exist. Under Patterson,
then, does the prosecution have the burden of proving general intent?
It seems that this would be an issue of legislative intent. Cf Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 261-63 (1952) (congressional silence as to mental elements in a
statute adopting common law concept of crime may have different meaning than silence
when creating an offense new to general law). If the legislature did not intend a strict
liability crime, see supra note 174, there would only be two possibilities: Either the prose-
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dictions involves identifying "particular states of mind [which are then]
attribute[d] to each of the material elements" 8 2 making up the actus reus
of the offense."8 3 The particular state of mind identified is usually a sub-
jective awareness-intent, knowledge or recklessness 11 4 --about the crim-
inal act.'8 5 For example, in People v. Hood 8 6 the court stated:
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve
a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal
intent. 8
7
The common law takes a similar approach to "specific intent," as does
cution was meant to prove general intent, or the defendant was meant to disprove it. It is
likely that the latter possibility would be constitutionally suspect. Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 224-25 nn.8-9 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting). The following discus-
sion is premised, therefore, on the reading into the statute of a general intent requirement
that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
182. H. Packer, supra note 58, at 105.
183. This approach to general mental state is variously labeled the "positive" ap-
proach, id. at 105-06, or the "descriptive" approach, G. Fletcher, supra note 74, § 6.2.1,
at 398.
184. Whether intoxication can ever negative "recklessness" depends on how the latter
concept is defined in a jurisdiction. If the prosecution must merely prove carelessness
about any aspect of the defendant's behavior, overlooking the risk of intoxication would
suffice and the recklessly intoxicated offender would have no defense. However, laws
patterned after the Model Penal Code
[require the prosecutor to prove recklessness specifically] in respect to the mate-
rial elements of some particular crime. The risk disregarded in reckless behav-
ior must be the risk that a material element 'exists or will result' from the
actor's conduct. Even if one were to insist that extreme drunkenness raises a
serious risk that harmful conduct of some sort will follow, one could hardly
demonstrate forensically, in most cases, that a particular risk had been disre-
garded by the decision to become drunk. Drinking to excess falls under the
definition only in a few situations where the actor foresees what he will be called
upon to do and knows something of the hazard which drunkenness creates in
respect to that conduct.
Paulsen, supra note 33, at 13-14. Thus, in a Model Penal Code jurisdiction, intoxication
dynamically could negative the awareness of risk necessary to recklessness.
It should be noted that, even though this is so, the Model Penal Code does not allow
the defendant to present such negativing evidence. Model Penal Code § 2.08 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962). This prohibition lowers, in practical terms, the prosecution's burden
of proving recklessness. A brief illustration makes the point. Assume that the prosecu-
tion is required to prove the defendant's conscious disregard of a substantial risk that his
behavior would cause damage to property. If the defendant could convince the jury that
he was so drunk that he was not aware of his own actions, the prosecution could not
prove this. But under section 2.08 the defendant will not be able to present his evidence
and the prosecution will have no evidence to overcome.
185. Williams defines mens rea as "intention or recklessness as to the elements consti-
tuting the actus reus." G. Williams, supra note 83, § 14, at 31. Justice Sherman stated in
Allard v. Selfridge & Co., [1925] 1 K.B. 129, 137: "The true translation of [mens real is
criminal intention, or an intention to do the act which is made penal by statute or by the
common law." This comment has been quoted by J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal
Law 71 (2d ed. 1960) and G. Williams, supra note 83, § 14, at 31 n.3.
186. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
187. Id. at 456-57, 462 P.2d at 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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the Model Penal Code to most mental state elements.188 Negativing de-
fenses would operate the same way for all of these subjective mental
states: Appropriate intoxication or mental abnormality could preclude
the existence of the required mental state.
1 89
A jurisdiction cannot both retain subjectively defined mens rea and
eliminate mental abnormality and intoxication as negativing defenses.
To exclude those defenses it has to discard subjective awareness as a
mental state requirement and allow all convictions to be based on objec-
tive culpability; this is usually known as a "reasonable person" standard
of negligence. A simple hypothetical demonstrates that this is so. As-
sume the jury believes that the defendant shot a human being with a gun
and also that the defendant was delusional and thought he was shooting
a bear. If the prosecutor must prove that the defendant was aware his
target was human (subjective mental state) the prosecutor will fail, as the
delusion will negative the element. But if the prosecutor merely has to
prove that a reasonable person would have been aware that the target
was human (objective mental state) the prosecutor will succeed. Since
the standard is not "the reasonable delusional person," the cause of the
defendant's failure to perceive the nature of his target is irrelevant. 90
But is there, in the logical progression of the objective approach, an
unspoken premise that the defendant is a reasonable person? If so, evi-
dence of intoxication or mental abnormality might negative that charac-
terization of the defendant. Does Patterson force the prosecution to
prove the defendant's reasonableness beyond a reasonable doubt? The
answer is that the objective approach is generally signified by the word
"negligence." The offense does not literally include as an element that
the defendant be a reasonable person, 91 and so the prosecution does not
have to prove that he is; any evidence to the contrary is what we have
labeled "extrinsic." In other words, the objective approach does not as-
sume that the defendant is a reasonable person; it merely indicates that
188. See Model Penal Code § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
189. For example, Paulsen states that intoxication could, theoretically, negative such
subjective mental states as purpose, knowledge, premeditation and deliberation. Paulsen,
supra note 33, at 9-11. He adds, in his discussion of "specific intent," that "[i]f purpose
or knowledge are not present, the cause for the lack is not important. The policy served
by requiring these elements of culpability will obtain whether or not their absence is
established by proof of extreme intoxication or any other evidence." Id. at 1I.
190. "If negligence is sufficient to justify criminal liability, the negligent actor should
not be freed merely because of his intoxication." Id. at 5.
191. Even using the Model Penal Code definition of "negligence" the prosecutor is not
required to prove that the defendant is a reasonable person:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material ele-
ment exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
the actor's situation.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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society will demand that he act like one. If he does not, for whatever
reasons, he must bear the consequences. The expectation of reasonable
behavior is either analagous or equivalent to the presumption of sanity in
criminal law: It is a premise that underlies all prosecutions, but one
which the law does not require the state to prove unless the state specifi-
cally includes "sanity" in the definition of the offense; a defendant may
prove that he is not sane, but this is extrinsic evidence. 192
So far, the discussion has focused on approaching "general intent" as a
limited, specifically defined concept. "General intent", however, is some-
times equated with the notion of criminal responsibility in the broadest
sense.193 Thus, "general intent" is whatever mental state exists when the
defendant commits the act and no excusing or, perhaps, justifying condi-
tions pertain. A leading proponent of this approach is H.L.A. Hart, who
commented:
[Flor some centuries English law . . . has made liability to punish-
ment for serious crime depend, not only on the accused doing the out-
ward acts which the law forbids, but on his having done them in
certain conditions which may broadly be termed mental. These mental
conditions of responsibility are commonly referred to by lawyers as
mens rea. This has meant that. . . liability to punishment is excluded
if the law was broken unintentionally, under duress or by a person
judged to be below the age of responsibility or to be suffering from
certain types of mental disease. 1
94
To put it differently, "a man who kills another is guilty of murder, unless
he did not kill intentionally or recklessly, or unless he believed that his
life was in danger. . . . In this analysis, the mental element is perceived
as relating exclusively to matters of justification, excuse, or mitiga-
tion."' 95 Under this broad approach, all excuses or justifications are neg-
192. See State v. McKenzie, 177 Mont. 280, 328-29, 581 P.2d 1205, 1232-33 (1978),
vacated, 443 U.S. 903 (1979).
It should be noted that a jurisdiction that defines mens rea as a specific subjective state
is already limiting the ability of mental abnormality or intoxication to provide negativing
defenses. This is because in very few individuals will reality perception be so impaired as
to prevent accurate processing of data from the surrounding world. Few defendants will
be able to show a disability that is logically relevant to the required subjective mental
state. Contrast this with a situation where mens rea is equated with criminal responsibil-
ity in the broadest sense, discussed infra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
193. This approach to general mental state has been labeled "normative," G. Fletcher,
supra note 74, § 6.2.1, at 398-99, and "negative," H. Packer, supra note 58, at 106-07; see
also R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra note 177, at 831-32 (combining the two types of ap-
proaches to mental state).
194. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 174 (1968).
195. H. Packer, supra note 58, at 106 (emphasis in original). Courts that use this ap-
proach tend to speak of "general intent" as the "capacity" to form a culpable mental state
or as the "presumption" of sanity, adulthood, lack of duress, and so forth. For example,
in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), the court decided that the
defendant had met his burden of producing evidence "sufficient to dissipate the presump-
tion of [his] sanity or sound mental health," id. at 761, and thus that "the burden was
shifted to the United States to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
possessed the necessary mental capacity, the guilty mind or mens rea, to be guilty of the
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ativing defenses.
When the definition of the offense involves "general intent" in such
broad terms, the range of negativing defenses cannot be controlled by
allowing the prosecution to prove "general intent" objectively. Consider
the psychotic defendant who, killing a person, thought he was shooting a
bear. The state could prove that he was objectively liable for homicide if
the reasonable person in that situation would have been aware that the
target was a human being. But, under current approaches to the insanity
defense, the defendant would still have the negativing argument of ex-
cuse. The state would have to eliminate mental abnormality and intoxi-
cation as excuses altogether to prevent them from negativing general
intent. 1 96
It may be, however, that there are some "excuses" a state cannot elimi-
nate.197 For example, the notion of proportionality between the punish-
ment and the offense may demand that some debilitating conditions be
inquired into at some phase of the guilt inquiry. 98 A jurisdiction using
the narrow approach to general intent could lessen the impact of this
requirement somewhat by allowing that inquiry only in the context of an
extrinsic defense with the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Such
flexibility, however, would be precluded in a jurisdiction taking a broad
approach to general intent, because this approach regards all excuses as
negativing.
crime with which he was charged." Id. The court pointed out that mens rea is "based on
the assumption that a person has a capacity to control his behavior and to choose be-
tween alternative courses of conduct." Id. at 773. Because we assume this, we can im-
pose a duty on people to control their behavior and punish them when they do not. Id.
Another court undertook an analysis of whether "a defendant's lack of mental disease or
defect, and his resulting ability to purposely or knowingly cause the death of another
person, is a fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." State v. McKenzie, 177
Mont. 280, 327, 581 P.2d 1205, 1232 (1978), vacated, 443 U.S. 903 (1979). It concluded
that the defendant's sanity was not an element in the definition of the crime charged, and
thus the state could rely on a rebuttable presumption of sanity. Id. at 328, 581 P.2d at
1232. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the defendant challenged a statute re-
quiring him to prove the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority,
rejecting this challenge, essentially distinguished the insanity defense from a defense
which negatives "premeditation and deliberation" or "intent." Id. at 794-96. The dis-
sent, however, seems to have equated the existence of mens rea with the absence of in-
sanity. Id. at 803-04 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
196. Adopting the broad approach to mens rea would appear to be functionally
equivalent to adopting the "procedural" interpretation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). See supra note 27.
197. See Wales, An Analysis of the Proposal to "'Abolish" the Insanity Defense in S. 1:
Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 687, 702-04 (1976) (discussing insanity defense).
Fletcher points out that "the posture of English and American law toward guilt as a
moral precondition of just punishment is highly ambivalent." G. Fletcher, supra note 74,
§ 7.3.1, at 537-38. A less ambivalent jurisprudence would require the state also to bear
the burden of persuasion on extrinsic defenses. See id. §§ 7.3.1-.2, at 533-45.
198. Constitutionality aside, there are ethical and jurisprudential arguments for the
retention of excuses in the criminal law. See, e.g., G. Fletcher, supra note 74, § 10.3.3, at
807-10; H. Packer, supra note 58, at 108-31; Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence:
A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 401, 412-15 (1971).
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Once aware of the dynamics traced above, a jurisdiction wishing to
eliminate mental abnormality and intoxication as negativing defenses
would adopt the narrow approach to mental state, treating excuses as
extrinsic defenses, and permitting conviction for all crimes on proof of
objective culpability, or negligence. However, a jurisdiction validly
might hesitate to adopt this approach. Such a broad net would sweep in
people who were negligent for reasons other than intoxication or mental
abnormality. There is considerable scholarly commentary that liability
based on negligence is inconsistent with the moral bases of our criminal
law.199 While the authors of the Model Penal Code recognize that there
might be utilitarian reasons for basing criminal liability on negligence,
they "agree that [negligence] should not be generally deemed sufficient in
the definition of specific crimes, and that it often will be right to differen-
tiate such conduct for the purposes of sentence."'  While the Model
Penal Code commentary does not specifically endorse the concept, it
mentions the notion that "education or corrective treatment not punish-
ment is the proper social method for dealing with persons with inade-
quate awareness, since what is implied is not a moral defect." ''
A jurisdiction that views negligence as an ethically inadequate basis for
serious criminal liability will suffer two consequences: First, it seldom
will be willing to use negligence as a mental state requirement in crimes;
second, when it does allow criminal liability on proof of negligence, it
will be unwilling to impose severe punishment. Few people will be con-
victed on the basis of negligence, and those who are will not be incapaci-
tated for long. From this standpoint, the civil commitment alternative
seems superior. It allows the state to incapacitate dangerous mentally
abnormal people, drug addicts and alcoholics for lengthy periods of time
199. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 198, at 435-37; Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be
Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632, 635-42 (1963). But see Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 415-17 (1958); Riesenfeld,
Negligent Homicide-A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 21-28
(1936); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 Colum. L Rev.
701, 749-51 (1937). In any case, "[n]egligence as an occasion for penal sanctions tends to
be reserved for conduct that the law-abiding citizen would be especially anxious to
avoid--eg., causing the death of another." Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1372-73.
Objective liability is also inconsistent with the modem trend toward individualization of
criminal culpability. See generally Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 13, at 429, 432-35 (dis-
cussion of the criticisms of the subjective approach). Goldstein notes that the trend to-
ward subjective liability, in fact, is directly responsible for the dilemma under
consideration in this Article. While the insanity defense was the sole vehicle for psychiat-
ric evidence where liability was objective, this is no longer true where subjective liability
obtains. "If [the fact of mental illness becomes relevant to defenses other than insanity],
difficult problems will be presented. . . for the courts. . . . Chief among them will be
the divergence between 'guilt' and dangerousness, for a subjective theory tends to treat
some of the most dangerous among us as the least guilty." A. Goldstein, supra note 137,
at 191.
200. Model Penal Code § 2.02 comment at 127 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The com-
mentary goes on to state that "negligence ought to be viewed as an exceptional basis of
liability." Id.
201. Id. at 126 (citing J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 245 (1st ed. 1947)).
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under conditions where rehabilitation, not punishment, is the principle
goal. Criminal sanctions would then be reserved for people whose culpa-
bility, expressed through the mental state requirement, is sufficient to
warrant ignominy and punishment.
In summary, changing the mental state requirement of existing crimes
is an inadequate way to ensure that dangerous people will be incapaci-
tated. Such a change would require that criminal liability be imposed on
proof of mere negligence. This would either seriously alter the nature of
the criminal law in general,20 2 or result in such minor sentences that the
interest in incapacitation would not be well served.
ii. Creating New Offenses
A jurisdiction might want to retain a subjective mental state require-
ment for crimes and nevertheless convict those whose abnormality or
intoxication cause delusions and attendant harm. To do this, the juris-
diction would have to create an offense with a subjective mental state
element that could not be negatived by those conditions. In other words,
conviction must be based on a defendant's awareness of something that
occurred when he was not mentally debilitated.
Such an offense could be created based on the following premise: If a
person knows that he suffers from a condition that, if not controlled,
would lead to delusions, society has a right to demand that he take steps
to exercise such control. He must take his medication, avoid drugs, vol-
untarily submit to supervision or do whatever else is necessary. Assum-
ing he is not delusional when he chooses to ignore such safeguards, 20 3 he
arguably will have a subjective mental state with regard to that decision.
Thus, he can be prosecuted for harm resulting from ensuing delusional
behavior. 2°
Such a statute would have certain appealing qualities. It would punish
202. While the common law has imposed criminal liability for negligence, it has not
done so on a broad scale nor accompanied it with severe punishment. Jeffries & Stephan,
supra note 3, at 1372-73. "More commonly. . . criminal liability is confined to some
variety of conscious wrongdoing. Thus, the minimum culpability most widely found in
the penal law is recklessness-a requirement of conscious disregard . . . ." Id. at 1372.
203. It may be necessary to medicate or detoxify adequately an individual before he is
in a state of mind capable of understanding his problem and how to control it. While
there may be people who cannot be brought to such a nondelusional state, these might
not be proper subjects for release from involuntary commitment, and thus would not be
in a position to be affected by the statute.
204. It is likely that a statute such as the one under discussion would not be unconsti-
tutional under the doctrine of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson,
the Court held unconstitutional a statute criminalizing the mere status of being a drug
addict, rather than the acts of possessing or using the drugs. Id. at 667. The statute
under discussion would not punish a person for being mentally abnormal or alcoholic; it
would punish him for failing to perform a known (perhaps statutory) duty to control such
conditions. Cf Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) (constitutional to punish
arguably alcoholic person for failing to control impulse to be drunk in public). Accord-
ing to dictum in Robinson, "a State might establish a program of compulsory treatment
for those addicted to narcotics. Such a program of treatment might require periods of
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individuals for morally culpable behavior-that is, the failure to take pre-
cautions.2"5 It also would permit grading the severity of the offense ac-
cording to the offender's degree of culpability for such failure. Thus, a
person who purposely omitted to take his medication, or who purposely
drank alcohol would be more culpable than one who had lapsed reck-
lessly. Certain limitations, however, should be incorporated into the
scheme.
First, as implied by its moral premise, the statutory scheme should
permit the prosecution only of an offender who has had the opportunity
to learn about the nature of his illness and how to control it.2" 6 Methods
of control might include drugs, abstinence from other drugs, or volun-
tary restriction of activities. Given an offender who had been taught
such methods, the statutory scheme would punish him when his failure
to put the methods into effect led to socially harmful results.
In addition, only significant harm-bodily injury or property dam-
age 2 7--should lead to punishment. Apart from any moral support for
this limitation, practical considerations of overcrowded prisons and jails,
congested courts, and burgeoning prosecutorial and defense expenses ar-
gue for a minimal creation of new crimes.
Finally, the new offense ideally should be aimed only at dangerous
individuals whom society cannot adequately incapacitate in another fash-
ion. Many mentally abnormal offenders, for example, are properly ac-
involuntary confinement. And penal sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply
with established compulsory treatment procedures." 370 U.S. at 665 (footnote omitted).
205. Sayre points out that the conception of mens rea has changed over time along
with the goals set for the criminal justice system. "Our modem objective tends more and
more in the direction, not of awarding adequate punishment for moral wrong-doing, but
of protecting social and public interests. To the extent that this objective prevails, the
mental element requisite for criminality, if not altogether dispensed with, is coming to
mean not so much a mind bent on evil-doing as an intent to do that which unduly endan-
gers social or public interest." Sayre, supra note 178, at 1017 (footnotes omitted).
206. The offense under discussion in this section differs from Hall's suggestion that
voluntary intoxication should not excuse criminal conduct if the defendant "had such
prior experience as to anticipate [his] intoxication and that [he] would become dangerous
in that condition." J. Hall, supra note 185, at 556. As Paulsen points out, it would be
difficult to litigate the defendant's previous experience with alcohol. Paulsen, supra note
33, at 16. The offense being discussed here would not require such litigation. Rather
than base culpability on prior experience of being dangerous while drunk, this offense
bases culpability on prior diagnosis and treatment of alcoholism or alcohol abuse. Such
prior events are easily documented and could be made known to the prosecution by
means of a discovery requirement accompanying a defendant's notice of intent to rely on
intoxication as a defense to a criminal charge. Upon such notice and discovery, the pros-
ecution could determine whether to charge this new offense in place of or in addition to
the crime already charged.
207. Degrees of culpability under the statute could vary with regard to the type or
extent of damage caused. But see Paulsen, supra note 33, at 15 ("The penalty for [an
offense of being 'drunk and dangerous'] would not be heavy lest the legislation be nullified
in all but the cases of great harm. If the offense of 'drunk and dangerous' were punished
by a heavy penalty and if the crime were prosecuted only when the harm caused by the
drunkenness was great, the result would be very similar to that reached under the present
law [equating recklessness in getting drunk with recklessness about the harm caused]").
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
quitted (and treated) after an insanity defense. This statute would not be
intended to permit a prosecutorial end-run around such an acquittal.
The insanity defense could be preserved if the new statute applied only to
offenders who were "mentally abnormal" in the sense that they lacked
normal perceptions about the physical world. In other words, a person
would be susceptible to conviction under the new offense only when his
condition provided a negativing, rather than extrinsic, defense to another
crime.
The problem is more complex with regard to intoxication. The statute
could limit the definition of "intoxication" to alcohol- or drug-induced
impairments that precluded the existence of subjective mental state.
Ways would have to exist, however, to prevent the conviction of people
who were morally blameless for being intoxicated in that way. One such
person might be "involuntarily" intoxicated in the sense that another in-
dividual had literally held him and poured a drug down his throat. This
person should be able to defend himself successfully using the "voluntary
act" doctrine.2"' A more difficult problem arises with the individual
who, for example, became intoxicated as a result of mixing prescription
drugs with other drugs or alcohol after the labels or the prescribing phy-
sician had failed to warn against the mix. Such a person arguably would
be morally blameless if he truly were not at fault for mixing the drugs.
The circumstance of innocent mixing could be made an extrinsic defense.
This would, of course, carry the option of putting the burden of persua-
sion on the defendant.
It is possible, then, to create an offense to convict and punish at least
some people whose lack of subjective awareness prevents conviction
under traditional crimes. While the offense can be created, however,
problems of detection and proof may make it impractical to enforce. In
addition, even assuming enforcement, there are objections and limita-
tions to such an approach as a less intrusive alternative to the exclusion
of negativing evidence. These, along with the problems inherent in the
previously discussed options, will be explored in the following sections.
2. The "Least Intrusive" Method of Incapacitation
The preceeding discussion has identified three ways in which people
who lack subjective awareness under traditional offenses can be allowed
to introduce negativing evidence to such criminal charges and neverthe-
less be incapacitated: The state can civilly commit them once acquitted;
it can alter the mental state requirement of crimes such that the evidence
is no longer "negativing"; or it can create a new offense which the evi-
208. For a review of the nature and history of the doctrines concerning "involuntary"
intoxication, see Hall, supra note 5, at 1054-55. Hall concludes, however, "after close
study of the cases, . . . that involuntary intoxication is simply and completely nonexis-
tent." Id. at 1056 (emphasis in original). Paulsen agrees that, although examples of in-
voluntary intoxication can be hypothesized, "cases in which the defense is successful
simply do not exist in the books." Paulsen, supra note 33, at 18.
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dence could not negative. It remains to be seen, however, whether, from
the point of view of the rights of the individual, these methods are really
less intrusive than exclusion of the negativing evidence in the first place.
The third option, creating a new offense, still results in the individual
being punished and stigmatized criminally." In fact, he may be pun-
ished as severely as if he had been convicted of the traditional offense.
Yet there is one way in which it can be said that this approach intrudes
less on his rights. Under the new offense sketched above, a person can-
not be convicted unless he first has had the opportunity of learning ways
to control his delusional behavior. In other words, he is given a chance
to live responsibly before the criminal sanction attaches. In contrast,
under the approach that exists in many jurisdictions today, negativing
evidence is excluded from consideration and the defendant is convicted,
regardless of whether he had any prior awareness of his delusional
condition.
The second option, altering the mental state requirement of existing
crimes to allow for objective fault, also would result in conviction and
punishment. This approach arguably is as intrusive on the defendant's
rights as the blanket exclusion, in that in both cases punishment is im-
posed without proof of subjective awareness. There is, however, a major
difference. If a person is convicted of negligence, the maximum sentence
may be slight,2"' but if he is inappropriately convicted of subjective
fault,211 he may be punished quite harshly. Thus, if jurisdictions lower
the sanctions when they alter the mental state requirement of existing
crimes, alteration will be a less intrusive alternative. If the punishment
remains harsh, however, alteration would be as intrusive as exclusion of
evidence. In the latter case, the balancing test would allow the state to
continue to exclude negativing evidence, assuming that the state's inter-
est in incapacitation was "compelling."
Option one involved the civil commitment of persons who were acquit-
ted because their evidence precluded proof of mental state. This ap-
proach seems less intrusive on individual rights in that the incapacitation
is not accompanied by "punishment"2 2 or the stigma of a criminal con-
viction. In addition, by not introducing the negativing evidence, the de-
fendant can "choose" prison over the mental institution. The approach
209. A defendant's interest in avoiding the particular stigma of criminal conviction has
been treated as seriously as his interest in avoiding incapacitation per se. Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 699-700 (1975). But see Allen, supra note 27, at 41 & n.52.
210. See supra pt. II.C.l.b.i.
211. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
212. Packer points out that treatment is commonly seen as less detrimental than pun-
ishment. He suggests that the difference between treatment and punishment "resides in
two related considerations: (1) the difference in justifying purposes; (2) the larger role of
the offending conduct in the case of Punishment." H. Packer, supra note 58, at 25. The
treated individual may be empirically worse off than the punished individual, but "justifi-
cation for Treatment rests on the view that the person subjected to it is or probably will
be 'better off' as a consequence." Id.
1984]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
could be seen as equally intrusive, however, in that fewer rights attend
civil commitment than criminal proceedings.21 3 In addition, as is well
known, civil commitment often results in warehousing rather than treat-
ment, especially when no truly effective treatment methods are known.214
Thus, all three alternatives present problems that arguably prevent
their being less intrusive than the exclusion of negativing evidence. In
addition, they are all open to attack on the basis that they will not result
in the incapacitation of all people acquitted for lack of subjective mental
state. Some people will fall through the cracks. They will not be civilly
committed for some reason. They will be released too soon.21 5 They will
be found to be non-negligent. They will not have been previously treated
and so be incapable of conviction under the new offense. It might be
argued that, as to these people only, the state could exclude negativing
evidence. That solution, of course, poses insurmountable practical
problems. It would be impossible to know, at the beginning of the crimi-
nal trial, whether or not the defendant will fit into one of these categories
and so be ineligible to present his negativing evidence. Because there is
no way that these three options will incapacitate all dangerous delusional
people, it might be argued that they are not viable options at all.21 6
To the extent that the three options discussed are not seen as less in-
trusive routes to incapacitation than is the exclusion of negativing evi-
dence, the characterization of the state's interest becomes a focal
concern. If that interest is compelling and the other options are not less
intrusive, the state arguably can continue to exclude negativing evidence.
The final section of this Article will discuss just how "compelling" the
state's interest in incapacitation really is. To some extent this discussion
will be informed by societal, as opposed to individual, objections to the
three potentially less intrusive options that have been discussed.
3. How "Compelling" is the State's Interest in Incapacitation?
According to the balancing test discussed above, a compelling state
interest sometimes can outweigh a defendant's interest in exercising fun-
damental rights.217 Thus, the stakes involved in the labeling game are
213. See, e.g., A. Stone, Mental Health and Law: A System in Transition 51-59 (1975);
Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Inadequacy of Existing Procedural and Sub-
stantive Protections, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 906, 923-28 (1981).
214. See supra note 168.
215. It probably can be accurately charged that, at least in some states, civil commit-
ment is a "revolving door" system in which people are treated, released, and re-commit-
ted endlessly. Thus, the claim may be made that the system does not ensure safety from
dangerous individuals who will be released "experimentally" until they once again show
that they are unsafe. Of course, the same "revolving door" criticism can be leveled at the
criminal justice system. On the other hand, it could be said that in the latter system, at
least society has the satisfaction of expressing its moral displeasure over the defendant's
behavior.
216. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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high. By terming the state interest "compelling," a court potentially al-
lows the exclusion of probative, reliable and crucial defense evidence.
But is the label valid here? The state wants to incapacitate dangerous
individuals. This is an obvious, important and popularly supported state
function. Yet there are cogent reasons why such an interest cannot be
labelled "compelling" for purposes of the balancing test.
These reasons begin with an examination of the connection between
the desire to incapacitate dangerous people and the desire to exclude ex-
pert testimony regarding mental abnormality or intoxication. Labeling
such evidence "unreliable" or "inefficient" masks the underlying fears
about handing real control of a trial's outcome over to a scientific com-
munity whose concerns may not reflect those of the general community.
The connection, in other words, involves popular mistrust and misappre-
hensions: first, about the extent to which the scientific community con-
trols the outcome in cases in which experts are used and, second, about
the frequency with which expert testimony provides the basis for acquit-
tals.21 It certainly is true that such fears have been one of the causes of
the current reaction against the insanity defense. t 9 Alcohol experts
probably have not been used often enough to create similar fears in the
lay community, but it can be predicted that increased use would have
that effect, especially because people tend to see intoxication as a volun-
tary condition to which moral stigma can attach.2"
While popular fears may not be the strongest reason for determining
rules of law, courts naturally would hesitate to release dangerous individ-
uals on grounds widely perceived as insufficient or unwise. Judges in
most state courts are, to some degree, popularly elected," 1 and even fed-
eral judges are sensitive to the role that public acceptance plays in legiti-
matizing their authority. 2 These fears and misapprehensions lead to
labeling the interest in incapacitation as "compelling" because such la-
218. See Morris, supra note 140, at 67 & nn.5-6. It is possible that the lay community
does not understand the ethical connection between mens rea and culpability, and thus
would object to the exculpatory effect of even well-restricted evidence on that issue. If
there were a popular demand for "strict" or objective culpability, however, the appropri-
ate response would not be to reduce the criteria sub rosa for selected defendants. Rather,
the legislature either should abolish mes rea and allow that step to be tested constitu-
tionally in the courts, or should educate the public about why it refuses to do so.
219. See Insanity Defense Overhaul Moves Ahead, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1984, at 25-26.
220. See Hall, supra note 5, at 1047, 1061; Paulsen, supra note 33, at 4-5, 15. Where
alcoholics are concerned, acceptance of the disease model of alcoholism shifts the locus of
the moral stigma from drinking per se to drinking after having been detoxified and edu-
cated about the nature of and cure for the disease. Alcohol, of course, is legally available,
and its use is encouraged in our society. An interesting question arises as to where to
place the moral stigma involved in being addicted to a drug (such as heroin) whose first
use was illegal.
221. See Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Representativeness,
31 Case W. Res. 409, 414 & nn. 25-26 (1981); Flango & Ducat, What Difference Does
Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 Just. Sys. J. 25, 26-28 & Table 1 (1979).
222. See Wasby, Arrogation of Power or Accountability: 'Judicial Imperialism' Revis-
ited, 65 Judicature 208, 218-19 (1981).
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beling is the only way the interest can outweigh defense rights that might
prevent incapacitation. If incapacitation is "compelling" and the presen-
tation of negativing evidence would lead to freedom, the evidence will be
excluded even if the resulting conviction is factually illogical.
Of course, it might be asked whether there is anything inherently
wrong with illogical jurisprudence, especially in the face of an historic
tradition of "fudging" criminal law principles to take care of social
problems.223 While "logic for logic's sake" might be enough of an an-
swer for some,224 there are other points to add. For one thing, society
still seems to put some emphasis or credence in the notion that there is
something special about the criminal sanction.225 In other words, only
those who are "evil" as well as dangerous should be labeled as criminals.
From this point of view, illogic might be tolerated if it served the end of
separating the blameworthy from the blameless. Perhaps the state's in-
terest in incapacitation should be deemed "compelling" only when di-
rected at those who are responsible for their disabilities.
This solution has surface appeal. Criminal law has traditionally con-
sidered intoxicated offenders as more blameworthy than mentally ill of-
fenders.226 If we could rely on these broad categories, and prevent only
the intoxicated from presenting logically relevant evidence, we might not
be disturbed at all by the way "illogic" was made to serve social ends.
There is an argument to be made, however, that the broad categories are
not trustworthy. As noted elsewhere,2 27 mentally ill offenders can be
considered blameworthy if they previously have been treated and choose
223. See, e.g., Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 154, 171-72 (1875) (opinion of
Blackburn, J.) (when statute prohibits taking unmarried girl under age of 16 against will
of father, fact that defendant believed her older and thus did not knowingly commit a
crime is irrelevant, because legislature's intent was to protect father's "legal right to the
possession" of the child until the age of 16); id. at 173-75 (opinion of Bramwell, B.)
(same); W. LaFave and A. Scott, supra note 23, at 545-61, 594-602 (charting history of
felony-murder rule from its creation in England, where it applied regardless of how dan-
gerous the felony was, to the present, when it no longer exists in England, and exists in
America only with regard to certain felonies; also charting similar history for "unlawful-
act manslaughter" rule).
224. The Supreme Court seems to have put a great deal of stock in logical jurispru-
dence in distinguishing Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), from Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). According to the dissent in Patterson, "[t]he Court [in distin-
guishing the two cases] manages to run a constitutional boundary line through the barely
visible space that separates Maine's law from New York's. It does so on the basis of
distinctions in language that are formalistic rather than substantive." Id. at 221 (Powell,
J., dissenting); accord, Jeifries & Stephan, supra note 3, at 1381. It might be noted in
passing that if the Supreme Court actually meant to elevate logic to the exalted position
implied in the cases, it may have bought itself more problems than it bargained for. Even
without the worries of the negativing defense discussed here, the federal courts may now
have to engage in the type of analysis involved in redefining offenses discussed supra pt.
II.C. .b.i. As has been noted, see Packer, supra note 172, at 107, the federal courts have
been loathe to embark on this endeavor.
225. See, e.g., H. Packer, supra note 58, at 23-31.
226. See W. LaFave and A. Scott, supra note 23, at 341-51.
227. See supra pt. II.C.l.b.ii.
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not to take the precautions necessary to prevent a recurrence of delu-
sional states. Intoxicated offenders arguably are not blameworthy if they
are undiagnosed alcoholics. If blameworthiness is analyzed in terms of
current understandings, the illogical jurisprudence may not, after all, be
successful in sorting the evil from the merely dangerous; or, more accu-
rately, the sorting will only occur by embroiling courts in case-by-case
inquiries into the nature of the defendant's condition before the evidence
can be introduced.
There is, moreover, another reason not to label as "compelling" the
state's interest in incapacitation. Even if that interest is so labeled, the
state cannot be totally successful in serving this interest if any defense
rights are allowed at all. Even where negativing evidence is excluded in a
criminal case, some dangerous people will be acquitted for other rea-
sons." 8 If convicted, some will be released from prison before they are
"safe."22 9 If society's interest in incapacitation were compelling in the
sense that all dangerous people should, by hook or by crook, be put
away, that interest would always outbalance all defense rights that lead
to freedom.230
If the state interest were "compelling" in this sense, trial (if permitted
at all) would look very different. The first order of business would be a
judicial determination of whether the individual would be dangerous to
others if released onto the streets. If so, the defendant would not be al-
lowed to put on any evidence, on any element, since that might lead to
acquittal and freedom. The defendant might not even be allowed to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses. But if this were the case, why even
bother to proffer criminal charges? Why not just have a determination of
"dangerousness" and let it go at that?
These rhetorical questions might seem far-fetched, but if the state's
interest in incapacitation is "compelling" in this sense, there is no princi-
pled way to draw lines between the defendant's constitutional rights that
228. Dangerous individuals whose negativing evidence is excluded on the element of
mental state may nevertheless be acquitted because of, inter alia, suppression of
prosecutorial evidence on fourth, fifth or sixth amendment grounds, the jury's belief of
alibi evidence, the jury's belief that the defendant was acting in self defense or the jury's
reasonable doubt about the prosecution's case. "Restraint cannot be attributed to poten-
tial 'dangerousness' associated with the crime charged, no matter how serious, for that
kind of 'dangerousness' is characteristic of defendants whose defenses prevail." Gold-
stein & Katz, supra note 54, at 866.
229. This is especially so because of the lack of effective treatment in prisons.
230. This prediction was fulfilled in Bethea v. United States, 365 A2d 64 (D.C. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977), where, in upholding exclusion of negativing evidence,
the court stated that
the rules by which we apply the principles of responsibility must serve simulta-
neously the legitimate concerns of the community for its security and the proper
administration of its criminal justice system as well as the interests of the indi-
vidual defendant.. . .Where the interests of the individual conflict with those
of society, the security of the community must be considered the paramount
objective.
Id. at 90 n.55 (citations omitted).
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remain and those that can be outweighed. Allowing defense rights will
always open the possibility of the defendant's freedom regardless of dan-
gerousness. In fact, the existence of constitutional rights can be seen as a
recognition that the state's interest in safety from danger is not all-en-
compassing.2 3' Allowing such an interest to outbalance defense rights
would increase state control to such an extent that the fundamental na-
ture of our society would be affected.
Labeling the state's interest as "compelling" can lead to excessive state
control in another way as well. The previous section of this Article la-
bored to find additional methods of institutionalizing citizens. These
contortions were necessary because the state's interest in doing so was
labeled "compelling." Central to the discussion was the expansion of the
civil commitment approach to incapacitation. Such an expansion is rela-
tively unthreatening to those whose alternative is exclusion of negativing
evidence and consequent incarceration when found guilty of a crime.
These people will be institutionalized in one way or the other. But an
increase in methods of institutionalization could affect individuals other
than those acquitted of crimes for lack of mental state. The threat is
especially strong with regard to civil commitment. Unless criteria are
defined so that a condition precedent to commitment is performance of
an act that would have been a crime, increasing the grounds for commit-
ment will expand considerably the state's power to institutionalize devi-
ant citizens who are merely bothersome. Unless civil commitment
procedures are made as demanding or nearly as demanding as criminal
procedures, there will be little an unwilling citizen can do to prevent such
institutionalization. For many, these possibilities evoke the aura of "Big
Brother" and totalitarian adjustment of social nonconformists.
The question of labeling the state's interest in incapacitating dangerous
people thus leads straight into a major conundrum of modern life: Do
we prefer the threats to our safety to come from our government or from
individuals? As mentioned above,2 32 it can be argued that those who
231. See United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15, 321
(1972) (government's interest in protecting itself from alleged domestic threat to national
security did not justify the government in ignoring citizens' rights to be free from unrea-
sonable search under the fourth amendment); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 110
(1965) (fact that penitentiary inmate was considered "dangerous" if released back into
society did not justify state in giving him fewer protections than nonincarcerated civil
commitment subject when determining whether to retain him in a mental institution
when his penal sentence expired). In his concurring opinion in United States v. United
States District Court, Justice Douglas quoted from United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
264 (1967): "'T]his concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself,
justifying any. . . power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in the term "national
defense" is the notion of defending those values and ideals which set this Nation apart
... .It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the
subversion of. . . those liberties .. . which [make] the defense of the Nation worth-
while.'" 407 U.S. at 332 (Douglas, J., concurring).
232. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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ratified the Constitution and its amendments have made the choice for
US.
CONCLUSION
In modem criminal practice, a prosecutor frequently is required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was subjectively
guilty of the offense charged. When this is so, the defendant may want to
introduce negativing evidence that he acted unintentionally, unknow-
ingly or nonrecklessly because of intoxication or mental abnormality. If
he is allowed to do so, the prosecution's burden will require disproving as
much of such evidence as the factfinder may believe.
Negativing evidence of this sort plunges the courts into a dilemma of
great proportions. If the evidence is excluded, these defendants alone
will be convicted on the basis of objective liability, arguably a profound
violation of their rights. If the evidence is allowed, potentially dangerous
people will be freed.
Courts and legislatures can obviate the dilemma by redefining crimes
to call for objective rather than subjective fault. As noted previously," 3
there are reasons why objective fault is not an acceptable basis for convic-
tion of a serious crime. To the extent that normal subjective liability
remains the standard, the dilemma persists.
A great number of American courts have attempted to resolve the
problem by labeling as generically "unreliable" or "inefficient" all evi-
dence of intoxication and mental abnormality outside the few, highly re-
stricted contexts, such as the extrinsic insanity defense, which lead to
coerced treatment or incapacitation. Such an approach may provide the
superficial appearance of respecting defense rights, in that no party has a
right to introduce substandard evidence, but the evidence may not, in
fact, be substandard, and in that case injustice persists. As has been
seen,234 it is unlikely that the "solution" of generic exclusion is constitu-
tional. At most, the Constitution may support a case-by-case evaluation
of the reliability and efficiency of evidence and permit exclusion only
where the state can show that less drastic, traditional safeguards fail to
protect the factfinding process.
Recognition of the unconstitutionality of the restrictions now com-
monly placed on the introduction of "negativing" defense evidence will
result in an increase in the use of such evidence and, most likely, an
increase in the number of people acquitted of criminal charges. These
acquittees, of course, will avoid the incapacitation or coerced treatment
attendant upon conviction.
Fear of such a result may make it tempting to justify exclusion of evi-
dence as necessary to further a state interest in safety. Such an approach,
however, would be tantamount to abolishing all defense rights that could
233. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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lead to the acquittal of dangerous offenders. Unless the courts are, in
essence, ready to rewrite the Constitution to bestow rights only upon the
harmless, this approach, too, is unworkable.
Rejection of the exclusionary approach does not, however, mean that
the state is helpless to protect society from drug and alcohol abusers,
addicts or mentally abnormal people who are acquitted of crimes. While
it may be impractical to refocus offenses,235 legislatures can revise civil
commitment schemes so that most criminally acquitted offenders will be
institutionalized nevertheless. In addition, legislatures can ensure that
the standards for commitment and release, and the type of treatment and
supervision afforded, adequately serve the civil rights and medical needs
of those individuals who cannot or will not provide for their own and
others' safety. Libertarian concerns may create some ambivalence con-
cerning the wisdom of civil commitment as a solution, despite the possi-
bility of procedural protections against unwarranted expansion of the
institution. The threats to civil liberties here, however, are obvious
enough that there may be a natural check on expansion of civil commit-
ment to the merely bothersome. Even today, civil commitment proce-
dures may be abused by friends or family with a sick loved one and no
place else to turn. Development of better community resources to help
nondangerous people with mental health and addiction problems would
eliminate some incentive for use of the civil commitment option. Finally,
in the cases in which it is clear that some form of incapacitation is war-
ranted, it is likely that civil commitment affords more hope of treatment
and re-integration into society than does any form of criminal incapacita-
tion. This likelihood provides some reason for attempting to cope with
whatever other dangers civil commitment presents. Of course, civil com-
mitment will not solve completely the problem of dangerous people. But
then, neither does the criminal law, even with rules that exclude defense
evidence.
While the above discussion has proceeded in constitutional terms, the
same points can be raised outside of the constitutional context. Indeed,
the tensions that have emerged are the precise tensions that underlie the
classical debates in substantive criminal jurisprudence: Should we allow
defenses that will increase the ethical integrity of the criminal law when
doing so will impair the ability of that law to control those who act dan-
gerously? Posing the question in light of the civil commitment alterna-
tive, and recognizing that modern society will incapacitate a dangerous
person when possible, we can ask whether we should label such a person
"bad" or "sick." Even without a constitutional mandate, states can re-
think the wisdom of their exclusionary rules in these terms.
Viewed in this light, the exclusionary rules under discussion may seem
even more perplexing. Why do these rules persist if ethical integrity and
social control both can be achieved by using civil commitment to inca-
235. See discussion supra pt. II.C.1.b.
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pacitate? Some, of course, may question the premise. Ethical integrity
may be seen as lacking when society institutionalizes noncriminals it can-
not cure. On the other hand, it is arguable that we are more likely to
seek cures for those who are merely "sick," knowing that we are safe
from them in any case.
The continued existence of the exclusionary rules is better explained by
the fact that use of the label "sick" deprives us of the catharsis accompa-
nying ritual application of the label "bad." Undeniably, the persons
under discussion here will have caused fear, trauma and loss to some
innocent victim. The society that still feels the need for retribution
against the offender may well be the society that has not yet accepted
meaningfully the notion that addicts and mentally abnormal people are
not responsible for their conditions.
It may be that, should society ever adopt that notion, we will want to
change our whole concept of mens rea to reflect the new ethic. Clearly,
the time for doing so is nowhere near at hand, and this author does not
support such a change. On the contrary, this Article merely argues that
society should finally live up to the ethic already reflected in the criminal
law as it exists today. This may be an area where the law must lead,
rather than follow, the sentiments of the crowd.
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